INSPECTING ARCHIVED INTELLIGENCE (OUTDATED VERSION).
SOCRadar Unit Discovers n0n Operator's Staging Server
|
2026-11-12 12:02
CRITICAL
HIGH
AI-ENABLED ATTACK · AUTONOMOUS
RANSOMWARE & EXTORTION
DATA BREACH
Executive Summary
AI-generated
n0n is a data-exfiltration and destructive-extortion group that surfaced on the Dark Web in September 2026 and scaled to 93 listed victims within roughly five weeks. Its operators exfiltrate data, encrypt or destroy infrastructure, and then work victims through keyed negotiation rooms, per-victim Bitcoin wallets and a public leak site branded with the slogan “n0n | no js | no mercy”. In September 2026, the SOCRadar Threat Research Unit (STRU) found an exposed staging server holding the live workspace of an n0n operator.
Technical Mitigations AI-generated
• Reset credentials and API keys that may have been exposed, and review access logs for the affected accounts or integrations.
Technical Observables 11 IoCs Login Required
Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) Protected
Raw threat telemetry, malicious IP addresses, file hashes, and direct VirusTotal correlation are restricted to authenticated users.
emails 1
domains 1
files 6
ips 3
Intelligence Metadata
Actors / Malware / CVEs / Campaigns
Target & Sectors
AFRICA
AFRICA
logisticslogistics
technologytechnology
retailretail
financefinance
Incident Timeline
September 2026
The SOCRadar Threat Research Unit discovered an exposed staging server belonging to the n0n Ransomware group in September 2026.
Click on any entity below to view its context and source!
tactic
Exfiltration
n0n is a data-exfiltration and destructive-extortion group that surfaced on the Dark Web in September 2026 and scaled to 93 listed victims within roughly five weeks.
n0n is a financially motivated data-exfiltration and destructive-extortion group active since September 2026.
tactic
Extortion
n0n is a data-exfiltration and destructive-extortion group that surfaced on the Dark Web in September 2026 and scaled to 93 listed victims within roughly five weeks.
n0n is a financially motivated data-exfiltration and destructive-extortion group active since September 2026.
victims
93 victims
n0n is a data-exfiltration and destructive-extortion group that surfaced on the Dark Web in September 2026 and scaled to 93 listed victims within roughly five weeks.
tactic
Ransomware
Who Is n0n Ransomware?
n0n has been actively monitored since September 2026.
organisation
the SOCRadar Threat Research Unit
In September 2026, the SOCRadar Threat Research Unit (STRU) found an exposed staging server holding the live workspace of an n0n operator.
infrastructure
Fortigate
The directory exposed the operation end to end: credential stuffing against FortiGate SSL-VPN appliances, hijacked firewall management centers, mass S3 deletion, a custom C++ locker, and an AI coding agent backed by more than $7,000 in paid LLM API usage.
organisation
FortiGate SSL-VPN
The directory exposed the operation end to end: credential stuffing against FortiGate SSL-VPN appliances, hijacked firewall management centers, mass S3 deletion, a custom C++ locker, and an AI coding agent backed by more than $7,000 in paid LLM API usage.
financial
$7,000
The directory exposed the operation end to end: credential stuffing against FortiGate SSL-VPN appliances, hijacked firewall management centers, mass S3 deletion, a custom C++ locker, and an AI coding agent backed by more than $7,000 in paid LLM API usage.
victims
23 organizations
The findings tie the workspace to at least 23 organizations across 14 countries.
September 10-28, 2026
…ervices: Agent box (185.157.161[.]148): Central staging node hosting the AI coding agent and the kserver C2 panel behind Cloudflare raas (188.214.135[.]130): Leak site backend, victim records, Electrum wallet, WinRM strike automation…
Click on any entity below to view its context and source!
infrastructure
Linux
…ervices:
Agent box (185.157.161[.]148):
Central staging node hosting the AI coding agent and the kserver C2 panel behind Cloudflare
raas (188.214.135[.]130):
Leak site backend, victim records, Electrum wallet, WinRM strike automation and C2 listeners
monster (81.161.239[.]10):
Loot vault where all exfiltration terminates, leak builder, implant tools and an HTTPS C2 listener
Seedbox:
tactic
Exfiltration
…ervices:
Agent box (185.157.161[.]148):
Central staging node hosting the AI coding agent and the kserver C2 panel behind Cloudflare
raas (188.214.135[.]130):
Leak site backend, victim records, Electrum wallet, WinRM strike automation and C2 listeners
monster (81.161.239[.]10):
Loot vault where all exfiltration terminates, leak builder, implant tools and an HTTPS C2 listener
Seedbox:
tactic
T1059.006 - Python
…ervices:
Agent box (185.157.161[.]148):
Central staging node hosting the AI coding agent and the kserver C2 panel behind Cloudflare
raas (188.214.135[.]130):
Leak site backend, victim records, Electrum wallet, WinRM strike automation and C2 listeners
monster (81.161.239[.]10):
Loot vault where all exfiltration terminates, leak builder, implant tools and an HTTPS C2 listener
Seedbox:
infrastructure
Windows
…ervices:
Agent box (185.157.161[.]148):
Central staging node hosting the AI coding agent and the kserver C2 panel behind Cloudflare
raas (188.214.135[.]130):
Leak site backend, victim records, Electrum wallet, WinRM strike automation and C2 listeners
monster (81.161.239[.]10):
Loot vault where all exfiltration terminates, leak builder, implant tools and an HTTPS C2 listener
Seedbox:
infrastructure
185.157.161
…ervices:
Agent box (185.157.161[.]148):
Central staging node hosting the AI coding agent and the kserver C2 panel behind Cloudflare
raas (188.214.135[.]130):
Leak site backend, victim records, Electrum wallet, WinRM strike automation and C2 listeners
monster (81.161.239[.]10):
Loot vault where all exfiltration terminates, leak builder, implant tools and an HTTPS C2 listener
Seedbox:
infrastructure
188.214.135
…ervices:
Agent box (185.157.161[.]148):
Central staging node hosting the AI coding agent and the kserver C2 panel behind Cloudflare
raas (188.214.135[.]130):
Leak site backend, victim records, Electrum wallet, WinRM strike automation and C2 listeners
monster (81.161.239[.]10):
Loot vault where all exfiltration terminates, leak builder, implant tools and an HTTPS C2 listener
Seedbox:
infrastructure
81.161.239
…ervices:
Agent box (185.157.161[.]148):
Central staging node hosting the AI coding agent and the kserver C2 panel behind Cloudflare
raas (188.214.135[.]130):
Leak site backend, victim records, Electrum wallet, WinRM strike automation and C2 listeners
monster (81.161.239[.]10):
Loot vault where all exfiltration terminates, leak builder, implant tools and an HTTPS C2 listener
Seedbox:
observable
185.157.161.148
…ervices:
Agent box (185.157.161[.]148):
Central staging node hosting the AI coding agent and the kserver C2 panel behind Cloudflare
raas (188.214.135[.]130):
Leak site backend, victim records, Electrum wallet, WinRM strike automation and C2 listeners
monster (81.161.239[.]10):
Loot vault where all exfiltration terminates, leak builder, implant tools and an HTTPS C2 listener
Seedbox:
observable
188.214.135.130
…ervices:
Agent box (185.157.161[.]148):
Central staging node hosting the AI coding agent and the kserver C2 panel behind Cloudflare
raas (188.214.135[.]130):
Leak site backend, victim records, Electrum wallet, WinRM strike automation and C2 listeners
monster (81.161.239[.]10):
Loot vault where all exfiltration terminates, leak builder, implant tools and an HTTPS C2 listener
Seedbox:
observable
81.161.239.10
…ervices:
Agent box (185.157.161[.]148):
Central staging node hosting the AI coding agent and the kserver C2 panel behind Cloudflare
raas (188.214.135[.]130):
Leak site backend, victim records, Electrum wallet, WinRM strike automation and C2 listeners
monster (81.161.239[.]10):
Loot vault where all exfiltration terminates, leak builder, implant tools and an HTTPS C2 listener
Seedbox:
tactic
T1059.001 - PowerShell
…ervices:
Agent box (185.157.161[.]148):
Central staging node hosting the AI coding agent and the kserver C2 panel behind Cloudflare
raas (188.214.135[.]130):
Leak site backend, victim records, Electrum wallet, WinRM strike automation and C2 listeners
monster (81.161.239[.]10):
Loot vault where all exfiltration terminates, leak builder, implant tools and an HTTPS C2 listener
Seedbox:
organisation
Cloudflare
…ervices:
Agent box (185.157.161[.]148):
Central staging node hosting the AI coding agent and the kserver C2 panel behind Cloudflare
raas (188.214.135[.]130):
Leak site backend, victim records, Electrum wallet, WinRM strike automation and C2 listeners
monster (81.161.239[.]10):
Loot vault where all exfiltration terminates, leak builder, implant tools and an HTTPS C2 listener
Seedbox:
data_breach
1,719 files
…ervices:
Agent box (185.157.161[.]148):
Central staging node hosting the AI coding agent and the kserver C2 panel behind Cloudflare
raas (188.214.135[.]130):
Leak site backend, victim records, Electrum wallet, WinRM strike automation and C2 listeners
monster (81.161.239[.]10):
Loot vault where all exfiltration terminates, leak builder, implant tools and an HTTPS C2 listener
Seedbox:
infrastructure
829 scripts
…ervices:
Agent box (185.157.161[.]148):
Central staging node hosting the AI coding agent and the kserver C2 panel behind Cloudflare
raas (188.214.135[.]130):
Leak site backend, victim records, Electrum wallet, WinRM strike automation and C2 listeners
monster (81.161.239[.]10):
Loot vault where all exfiltration terminates, leak builder, implant tools and an HTTPS C2 listener
Seedbox:
general_metric
589 Python
…ervices:
Agent box (185.157.161[.]148):
Central staging node hosting the AI coding agent and the kserver C2 panel behind Cloudflare
raas (188.214.135[.]130):
Leak site backend, victim records, Electrum wallet, WinRM strike automation and C2 listeners
monster (81.161.239[.]10):
Loot vault where all exfiltration terminates, leak builder, implant tools and an HTTPS C2 listener
Seedbox:
general_metric
28 PowerShell
…ervices:
Agent box (185.157.161[.]148):
Central staging node hosting the AI coding agent and the kserver C2 panel behind Cloudflare
raas (188.214.135[.]130):
Leak site backend, victim records, Electrum wallet, WinRM strike automation and C2 listeners
monster (81.161.239[.]10):
Loot vault where all exfiltration terminates, leak builder, implant tools and an HTTPS C2 listener
Seedbox:
infrastructure
207 shell scripts
…ervices:
Agent box (185.157.161[.]148):
Central staging node hosting the AI coding agent and the kserver C2 panel behind Cloudflare
raas (188.214.135[.]130):
Leak site backend, victim records, Electrum wallet, WinRM strike automation and C2 listeners
monster (81.161.239[.]10):
Loot vault where all exfiltration terminates, leak builder, implant tools and an HTTPS C2 listener
Seedbox:
general_metric
5 C++ encryptor sources
…ervices:
Agent box (185.157.161[.]148):
Central staging node hosting the AI coding agent and the kserver C2 panel behind Cloudflare
raas (188.214.135[.]130):
Leak site backend, victim records, Electrum wallet, WinRM strike automation and C2 listeners
monster (81.161.239[.]10):
Loot vault where all exfiltration terminates, leak builder, implant tools and an HTTPS C2 listener
Seedbox:
September 17
Activity September 17 Negotiation portals opened September 18 Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed September 23-25 First leak wave (10 organizations) September 25-26 Exposed staging server identified by STRU September 27-29 Second…
Click on any entity below to view its context and source!
target_region
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
organisation
ISP Inter
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
victims
10 organizations
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
victims
3 organizations
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
victims
2 organizations
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
general_metric
38 maritime
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
September 18, 2026
…es to BLOCK, and claimed to have severed national network traffic on September 18, 2026, alongside a 15 BTC demand n0n’s note on its control of the Inter network Fanatics (sports e-commerce, US): An exposed AWS access key enabled…
Click on any entity below to view its context and source!
target_region
United States
…es to BLOCK, and claimed to have severed national network traffic on September 18, 2026, alongside a 15 BTC demand
n0n’s note on its control of the Inter network
Fanatics (sports e-commerce, US):
An exposed AWS access key enabled exfiltration from 40 S3 buckets, followed by deletion of a bank-transaction archive and twelve confidential buckets without any encryptor; the group claimed 21…
tactic
Exfiltration
…es to BLOCK, and claimed to have severed national network traffic on September 18, 2026, alongside a 15 BTC demand
n0n’s note on its control of the Inter network
Fanatics (sports e-commerce, US):
An exposed AWS access key enabled exfiltration from 40 S3 buckets, followed by deletion of a bank-transaction archive and twelve confidential buckets without any encryptor; the group claimed 21…
tactic
Credential Stuffing
…es to BLOCK, and claimed to have severed national network traffic on September 18, 2026, alongside a 15 BTC demand
n0n’s note on its control of the Inter network
Fanatics (sports e-commerce, US):
An exposed AWS access key enabled exfiltration from 40 S3 buckets, followed by deletion of a bank-transaction archive and twelve confidential buckets without any encryptor; the group claimed 21…
infrastructure
Fortigate
…es to BLOCK, and claimed to have severed national network traffic on September 18, 2026, alongside a 15 BTC demand
n0n’s note on its control of the Inter network
Fanatics (sports e-commerce, US):
An exposed AWS access key enabled exfiltration from 40 S3 buckets, followed by deletion of a bank-transaction archive and twelve confidential buckets without any encryptor; the group claimed 21…
observable
inter_lock.py
…es to BLOCK, and claimed to have severed national network traffic on September 18, 2026, alongside a 15 BTC demand
n0n’s note on its control of the Inter network
Fanatics (sports e-commerce, US):
An exposed AWS access key enabled exfiltration from 40 S3 buckets, followed by deletion of a bank-transaction archive and twelve confidential buckets without any encryptor; the group claimed 21…
organisation
Cisco Firepower Management Center
…es to BLOCK, and claimed to have severed national network traffic on September 18, 2026, alongside a 15 BTC demand
n0n’s note on its control of the Inter network
Fanatics (sports e-commerce, US):
An exposed AWS access key enabled exfiltration from 40 S3 buckets, followed by deletion of a bank-transaction archive and twelve confidential buckets without any encryptor; the group claimed 21…
organisation
Inter
…es to BLOCK, and claimed to have severed national network traffic on September 18, 2026, alongside a 15 BTC demand
n0n’s note on its control of the Inter network
Fanatics (sports e-commerce, US):
An exposed AWS access key enabled exfiltration from 40 S3 buckets, followed by deletion of a bank-transaction archive and twelve confidential buckets without any encryptor; the group claimed 21…
organisation
AWS
…es to BLOCK, and claimed to have severed national network traffic on September 18, 2026, alongside a 15 BTC demand
n0n’s note on its control of the Inter network
Fanatics (sports e-commerce, US):
An exposed AWS access key enabled exfiltration from 40 S3 buckets, followed by deletion of a bank-transaction archive and twelve confidential buckets without any encryptor; the group claimed 21…
organisation
FortiGate
…es to BLOCK, and claimed to have severed national network traffic on September 18, 2026, alongside a 15 BTC demand
n0n’s note on its control of the Inter network
Fanatics (sports e-commerce, US):
An exposed AWS access key enabled exfiltration from 40 S3 buckets, followed by deletion of a bank-transaction archive and twelve confidential buckets without any encryptor; the group claimed 21…
financial
15 BTC
…es to BLOCK, and claimed to have severed national network traffic on September 18, 2026, alongside a 15 BTC demand
n0n’s note on its control of the Inter network
Fanatics (sports e-commerce, US):
An exposed AWS access key enabled exfiltration from 40 S3 buckets, followed by deletion of a bank-transaction archive and twelve confidential buckets without any encryptor; the group claimed 21…
general_metric
40 S3 buckets
…es to BLOCK, and claimed to have severed national network traffic on September 18, 2026, alongside a 15 BTC demand
n0n’s note on its control of the Inter network
Fanatics (sports e-commerce, US):
An exposed AWS access key enabled exfiltration from 40 S3 buckets, followed by deletion of a bank-transaction archive and twelve confidential buckets without any encryptor; the group claimed 21…
data_breach
217.7 GB
…es to BLOCK, and claimed to have severed national network traffic on September 18, 2026, alongside a 15 BTC demand
n0n’s note on its control of the Inter network
Fanatics (sports e-commerce, US):
An exposed AWS access key enabled exfiltration from 40 S3 buckets, followed by deletion of a bank-transaction archive and twelve confidential buckets without any encryptor; the group claimed 21…
financial
30 BTC
…es to BLOCK, and claimed to have severed national network traffic on September 18, 2026, alongside a 15 BTC demand
n0n’s note on its control of the Inter network
Fanatics (sports e-commerce, US):
An exposed AWS access key enabled exfiltration from 40 S3 buckets, followed by deletion of a bank-transaction archive and twelve confidential buckets without any encryptor; the group claimed 21…
industry
Logistics
General Document Context
industry
Finance
General Document Context
industry
Retail
General Document Context
industry
Technology
General Document Context
organisation
the United Federation of Teachers
Demands ranged from 0.5 BTC for a government ministry to 33.04 BTC for the United Federation of Teachers.
financial
0.5 BTC
Demands ranged from 0.5 BTC for a government ministry to 33.04 BTC for the United Federation of Teachers.
financial
33.04 BTC
Demands ranged from 0.5 BTC for a government ministry to 33.04 BTC for the United Federation of Teachers.
victims
23 organizations
The staging server’s data covers 23 organizations across 14 countries in 15 distinct sectors, with Software/SaaS and retail tied at three victims each.
victims
15 distinct sectors
The staging server’s data covers 23 organizations across 14 countries in 15 distinct sectors, with Software/SaaS and retail tied at three victims each.
September 18
Activity September 17 Negotiation portals opened September 18 Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed September 23-25 First leak wave (10 organizations) September 25-26 Exposed staging server identified by STRU September 27-29 Second…
Click on any entity below to view its context and source!
target_region
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
organisation
ISP Inter
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
victims
10 organizations
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
victims
3 organizations
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
victims
2 organizations
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
general_metric
38 maritime
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
September 23-25
Activity September 17 Negotiation portals opened September 18 Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed September 23-25 First leak wave (10 organizations) September 25-26 Exposed staging server identified by STRU September 27-29 Second…
Click on any entity below to view its context and source!
target_region
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
organisation
ISP Inter
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
victims
10 organizations
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
victims
3 organizations
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
victims
2 organizations
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
general_metric
38 maritime
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
September 25-26
Activity September 17 Negotiation portals opened September 18 Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed September 23-25 First leak wave (10 organizations) September 25-26 Exposed staging server identified by STRU September 27-29 Second…
Click on any entity below to view its context and source!
target_region
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
organisation
ISP Inter
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
victims
10 organizations
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
victims
3 organizations
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
victims
2 organizations
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
general_metric
38 maritime
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
September 25 and
Portals rebuilt n0n campaign timeline, September-October 2026 Inside the Exposed n0n Operator Workspace STRU identified a Python HTTP file server at 185.157.161[.]148:8877 exposing the operator’s live working directory across two…
Click on any entity below to view its context and source!
tactic
T1059.006 - Python
Portals rebuilt
n0n campaign timeline, September-October 2026
Inside the Exposed n0n Operator Workspace
STRU identified a Python HTTP file server at 185.157.161[.]148:8877 exposing the operator’s live working directory across two snapshots on September 25 and 26, 2026.
observable
185.157.161.148
Portals rebuilt
n0n campaign timeline, September-October 2026
Inside the Exposed n0n Operator Workspace
STRU identified a Python HTTP file server at 185.157.161[.]148:8877 exposing the operator’s live working directory across two snapshots on September 25 and 26, 2026.
September 27-29
Activity September 17 Negotiation portals opened September 18 Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed September 23-25 First leak wave (10 organizations) September 25-26 Exposed staging server identified by STRU September 27-29 Second…
Click on any entity below to view its context and source!
target_region
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
organisation
ISP Inter
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
victims
10 organizations
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
victims
3 organizations
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
victims
2 organizations
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
general_metric
38 maritime
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
October 2026
The n0n ransomware operator used a combination of exploits, custom-built binaries, and AI-assisted coding to target victims through initial access via compromised credentials.
Click on any entity below to view its context and source!
infrastructure
Linux
The Linux variant is the most cautious build: it writes to a .n0n.tmp file, decrypts and verifies the result against an MD5 checksum, and only then renames the file.
infrastructure
Windows
Creation of the hidden admin account svc_upd
Exfiltration
Each victim gets a dedicated pipeline with per-target byte budgets, from 1 GB to 110 GB per cloud bucket and an 8 GiB cap for in-band Windows exfiltration.
data_breach
1 GB
Creation of the hidden admin account svc_upd
Exfiltration
Each victim gets a dedicated pipeline with per-target byte budgets, from 1 GB to 110 GB per cloud bucket and an 8 GiB cap for in-band Windows exfiltration.
data_breach
110 GB
Creation of the hidden admin account svc_upd
Exfiltration
Each victim gets a dedicated pipeline with per-target byte budgets, from 1 GB to 110 GB per cloud bucket and an 8 GiB cap for in-band Windows exfiltration.
infrastructure
46 servers
Destruction is a deliberate lever on its own: the operator purges source files after exfiltration, flips firewall rules to BLOCK, and in one case claimed to have removed 46 servers and their backups.
data_breach
33 bytes
At FinSoft, the first two PowerShell versions failed because a Base64 key decoded to 33 bytes, and a third version fixed the bug mid-attack.
organisation
WireGuard
Torrent seeding of all leak archives over a commercial WireGuard VPN, with a watchdog that resets stale tunnels
Cover domains, Tor relays, an SSH pivot, residential proxies and third-party AI gateways insulate these core servers.
organisation
Tor
Torrent seeding of all leak archives over a commercial WireGuard VPN, with a watchdog that resets stale tunnels
Cover domains, Tor relays, an SSH pivot, residential proxies and third-party AI gateways insulate these core servers.
organisation
Initial Access Through
Initial Access Through Credentials
STRU found no exploit payloads or CVE references in the workspace.
organisation
The n0n Encryptor
The n0n Encryptor
The original C++ source of the locker was recovered from the staging server; the compiled binaries were not.
organisation
AES-256-CBC
The locker is a lightweight AES-256-CBC file encryptor with no network capability, key exchange, per-victim keys, ransom note logic, persistence or anti-analysis.
organisation
AI-Assisted Operations
AI-Assisted Operations
The operator works with opencode, an open-source AI coding agent, configured with 154 model entries across 7 providers, including commercial gateways, “uncensored” and “abliterated” models with safety training removed, and a self-hosted Qwen 27B model on a rented GPU server.
data_breach
32 byte
Each build uses a single hardcoded 32-byte key.
October 1-2
Third
Activity September 17 Negotiation portals opened September 18 Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed September 23-25 First leak wave (10 organizations) September 25-26 Exposed staging server identified by STRU September 27-29 Second…
Click on any entity below to view its context and source!
target_region
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
organisation
ISP Inter
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
victims
10 organizations
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
victims
3 organizations
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
victims
2 organizations
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
general_metric
38 maritime
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
October 5-7
Activity September 17 Negotiation portals opened September 18 Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed September 23-25 First leak wave (10 organizations) September 25-26 Exposed staging server identified by STRU September 27-29 Second…
Click on any entity below to view its context and source!
target_region
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
organisation
ISP Inter
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
victims
10 organizations
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
victims
3 organizations
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
victims
2 organizations
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
general_metric
38 maritime
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
October 12, 2026
N0n Ransomware operators used SSH-D SOCKS tunnels over Tor and multi-hop proxies to establish a Command and Control (C2) infrastructure.
Click on any entity below to view its context and source!
industry
Logistics
General Document Context
industry
Finance
General Document Context
industry
Retail
General Document Context
industry
Technology
General Document Context
target_region
Korea, Republic of
On October 12, 2026, n0n listed 38 maritime, port and logistics organizations across 18 countries in a single batch, with demands from $0.4M to $28M and a combined $275.8M. Maritime security research tied at least 21 of the 38 to customers of South Korean maritime software provider CyberLogitec, but CyberLogitec has not confirmed an incident, and one listing reuses another victim’s sample file,…
organisation
CyberLogitec
On October 12, 2026, n0n listed 38 maritime, port and logistics organizations across 18 countries in a single batch, with demands from $0.4M to $28M and a combined $275.8M. Maritime security research tied at least 21 of the 38 to customers of South Korean maritime software provider CyberLogitec, but CyberLogitec has not confirmed an incident, and one listing reuses another victim’s sample file,…
general_metric
18 countries
On October 12, 2026, n0n listed 38 maritime, port and logistics organizations across 18 countries in a single batch, with demands from $0.4M to $28M and a combined $275.8M. Maritime security research tied at least 21 of the 38 to customers of South Korean maritime software provider CyberLogitec, but CyberLogitec has not confirmed an incident, and one listing reuses another victim’s sample file,…
financial
$0.4 M
On October 12, 2026, n0n listed 38 maritime, port and logistics organizations across 18 countries in a single batch, with demands from $0.4M to $28M and a combined $275.8M. Maritime security research tied at least 21 of the 38 to customers of South Korean maritime software provider CyberLogitec, but CyberLogitec has not confirmed an incident, and one listing reuses another victim’s sample file,…
financial
$28 M
On October 12, 2026, n0n listed 38 maritime, port and logistics organizations across 18 countries in a single batch, with demands from $0.4M to $28M and a combined $275.8M. Maritime security research tied at least 21 of the 38 to customers of South Korean maritime software provider CyberLogitec, but CyberLogitec has not confirmed an incident, and one listing reuses another victim’s sample file,…
general_metric
21 research
On October 12, 2026, n0n listed 38 maritime, port and logistics organizations across 18 countries in a single batch, with demands from $0.4M to $28M and a combined $275.8M. Maritime security research tied at least 21 of the 38 to customers of South Korean maritime software provider CyberLogitec, but CyberLogitec has not confirmed an incident, and one listing reuses another victim’s sample file,…
organisation
Defend Against n0n Ransomware
How to Defend Against n0n Ransomware
Harden remote access:
Enforce
phishing
-resistant MFA on RDP, SSL-VPN and admin portals, monitor /remote/logincheck for credential stuffing, and invalidate credentials found in infostealer logs
Lock down firewall management:
organisation
Attribution
Sector distribution of victims
Attribution
SOCRadar STRU assesses with medium confidence that n0n is a multi-operator, large-scale cybercrime operation, and that the exposed server is a private workspace belonging to core operators or administrators rather than hired affiliates.
October 12
Activity September 17 Negotiation portals opened September 18 Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed September 23-25 First leak wave (10 organizations) September 25-26 Exposed staging server identified by STRU September 27-29 Second…
Click on any entity below to view its context and source!
target_region
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
organisation
ISP Inter
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
victims
10 organizations
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
victims
3 organizations
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
victims
2 organizations
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
general_metric
38 maritime
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
October 15, 2026
Automated countdown warnings reach union leadership, MSPs, clients and media outlets, with the line “Silence is read as refusal.” An inspection of the leak portal on October 15, 2026, showed 93 targeted entities: 52 marked “exposed,” 21…
Click on any entity below to view its context and source!
victims
93 victims
An inspection of the leak portal on October 15, 2026, showed 93 targeted entities: 52 marked “exposed,” 21 “leaked,” 15 “pending,” and 5 “honored” after ransom payments.
Tracking logged 93 victims across 27 countries, with the heaviest concentration in the United States and South Korea.
industry
Logistics
General Document Context
industry
Finance
General Document Context
industry
Retail
General Document Context
industry
Technology
General Document Context
general_metric
15 exposed pending
An inspection of the leak portal on October 15, 2026, showed 93 targeted entities: 52 marked “exposed,” 21 “leaked,” 15 “pending,” and 5 “honored” after ransom payments.
organisation
FinSoft
n0n negotiation room for FinSoft
Pressure Tactics
Extortion emails are sent direct to victims’ mail exchangers from notice@n0n-cases[.]net through custom Python scripts, bypassing standard mail providers.
threat_actor
Silence
Automated countdown warnings reach union leadership, MSPs, clients and media outlets, with the line “Silence is read as refusal.”
organisation
PayPal
In the Transcom incident, a secondary alert went directly to PayPal’s security team, even though the compromised data sat only on Transcom’s network.
organisation
Transcom
In the Transcom incident, a secondary alert went directly to PayPal’s security team, even though the compromised data sat only on Transcom’s network.
organisation
SOCRadar
SOCRadar collected 55 addresses from ransom notes, maritime cases, operator derivation scripts and leak-site sources.
October 19
As of October 19, total listed ransom demands reached $283.7M.
Click on any entity below to view its context and source!
target_region
United States
Five such cards were logged by October 19, including one previously named US company and one apparent internal test entry, though no transactions have been validated on-chain.
observable
leak.zip
Archives are hosted on the leak site and seeded as torrents from a VPN-backed seedbox, and a public counter recorded 176,901 leak.zip downloads by October 19.
general_metric
176,901 counter
Archives are hosted on the leak site and seeded as torrents from a VPN-backed seedbox, and a public counter recorded 176,901 leak.zip downloads by October 19.
target_region
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
organisation
ISP Inter
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
victims
10 organizations
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
victims
3 organizations
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
victims
2 organizations
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
general_metric
38 maritime
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
general_metric
4 site
As of October 19, 15 of them were published on the leak site, 4 were compromised but not published, and for 4 more, access was attempted with no outcome shown.
victims
93 victims
As of October 19, the attack organization has posted information on its self-operated leak site about 93 victims, with a total of approximately $283,700,000 demanded in ransom.
October 22, 2026
The n0n ransomware operator used a single hardcoded 32-byte key across multiple builds, resulting in potential decryptor overlap between victims.
Click on any entity below to view its context and source!
financial
$7,216
Billing records confirm active use of three gateways, and key-status checks show more than $7,216 in API spending as of October 22, 2026, with spending focused mainly on safety-removed models.
The operator uses the opencode AI coding agent with 154 configured models, including uncensored and safety-removed models and a self-hosted Qwen 27B model, and spent more than $7,216 on LLM APIs by October 22, 2026.
industry
Logistics
General Document Context
industry
Finance
General Document Context
industry
Retail
General Document Context
industry
Technology
General Document Context
organisation
Decoy
Decoy login page of the operator’s kserver C2 panel
Notable n0n Cases
Dediserve (cloud hosting, Ireland/Germany):
infrastructure
Linux
Stolen admin browser credentials led to takeover of the provider’s management stack; the operator ran commands through Zabbix scripts and OnApp recipes named “disk usage check” and “maintenance check,” converted tenant backups into VM templates, and deployed the only Linux n0n locker variant
Inter (ISP, Venezuela):
organisation
Zabbix
Stolen admin browser credentials led to takeover of the provider’s management stack; the operator ran commands through Zabbix scripts and OnApp recipes named “disk usage check” and “maintenance check,” converted tenant backups into VM templates, and deployed the only Linux n0n locker variant
Inter (ISP, Venezuela):
organisation
OnApp
Stolen admin browser credentials led to takeover of the provider’s management stack; the operator ran commands through Zabbix scripts and OnApp recipes named “disk usage check” and “maintenance check,” converted tenant backups into VM templates, and deployed the only Linux n0n locker variant
Inter (ISP, Venezuela):
organisation
STRU
The configuration defines no automatic failover between models, and STRU observed a human-directed operation supported by AI, with no fully autonomous attack system.
organisation
Cybersecurity Content Development Specialist
Amir Owda
Amir Owda is a Cybersecurity Content Development Specialist at SOCRadar.
data_breach
32 byte
Each n0n build uses a single hardcoded 32-byte key, and the same key appears in two builds used against different victims, so one victim’s decryptor would likely decrypt another’s files.
October 22
Activity September 17 Negotiation portals opened September 18 Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed September 23-25 First leak wave (10 organizations) September 25-26 Exposed staging server identified by STRU September 27-29 Second…
Click on any entity below to view its context and source!
target_region
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
organisation
ISP Inter
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
victims
10 organizations
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
victims
3 organizations
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
victims
2 organizations
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
general_metric
38 maritime
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
October 28
SOCRadar released a threat analysis report on October 28 detailing the analysis of 'n0n's attack servers and internal working environment.
Click on any entity below to view its context and source!
tactic
Ransomware
Global cybersecurity intelligence company, SOCRadar, released a threat analysis report on October 28, detailing the analysis of the ransomware group 'n0n's attack servers and internal working environment.
2026/11/12
The n0n ransomware group used artificial intelligence to develop attack tools and carried out large-scale financial theft against 93 global companies, resulting in a total loss of $283,700,000.
Click on any entity below to view its context and source!
infrastructure
Windows
Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
Uploads to a public file-hosting service
Impact
T1486
– Data Encrypted for Impact
n0n locker (Windows/Linux) and the OpenSSL stage on FMC appliances
Impact
T1485
– Data Destruction
S3 mass deletion; a provider’s servers and backups removed
Impact
T1490
– Inhibit System Recovery
Shadow copies deleted; free space wiped
Impact
T1489
– Service Stop
MSSQL, MySQL and…
Variant
Platform
Used Against
nenc.cpp (v1)
Windows, CNG / AES-NI
AFRICA-TECH; FinSoft
nenc2.cpp (v2)
Windows, CNG
Staged against a medical-laboratory database server
nenc2l.cpp / nenc2l_main.cpp
Linux, OpenSSL EVP or tiny-AES-c
Dediserve
finenc3-5.ps1, denc.ps1, datasweep.ps1
PowerShell / .NET
FinSoft
FMC appliance stage
Cisco FMC (Linux), OpenSSL
Firewall-manager victims
n0n execution chain…
…5985/1433
Discovery
T1580
– Cloud Infrastructure Discovery
EC2/ECS/SSM mapping and hosting-panel VM inventories
Discovery
T1619
– Cloud Storage Object Discovery
S3 bucket listing and prefix census
Lateral Movement
T1021.001
– Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol
Headless xfreerdp sessions driven by key injection and OCR
Lateral Movement
T1021.006
– Remote Services: Windows Remote Managem…
infrastructure
Fortigate
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Used by n0n
Tactic
Technique
Procedure
Reconnaissance
T1595.001
– Active Scanning: Scanning IP Blocks
RDP batch scans and a ranked list of 305 FortiGate SSL-VPN appliances
Initial Access
T1078
– Valid Accounts
Weak or default RDP/WinRM administrator credentials; firewall-manager admin accounts
Initial Access
T1078.004
– Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
Exposed long-liv…
Every documented intrusion relied on weak or compromised credentials:
FortiGate SSL-VPN credential stuffing:
A 15-thread routine through residential proxy pools against an index of 305 appliances, with every request carrying the header Cookie: APBSID=n0n
RDP and WinRM:
Sequential sweeps for default or weak passwords, driven by OCR-assisted RDP scripts
Cloud credentials:
Long-lived AWS…
…0 for the cover accounts
Defense Evasion
T1070.004
– Indicator Removal: File Deletion
Toolkit overwritten three times and deleted; launchers self-delete
Credential Access
T1110.004
– Brute Force: Credential Stuffing
FortiGate /remote/logincheck credential stuffing via residential proxies (APBSID=n0n)
Credential Access
T1110.002
– Brute Force: Password Cracking
Offline cracking of stolen SaaS…
infrastructure
Linux
Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
Uploads to a public file-hosting service
Impact
T1486
– Data Encrypted for Impact
n0n locker (Windows/Linux) and the OpenSSL stage on FMC appliances
Impact
T1485
– Data Destruction
S3 mass deletion; a provider’s servers and backups removed
Impact
T1490
– Inhibit System Recovery
Shadow copies deleted; free space wiped
Impact
T1489
– Service Stop
MSSQL, MySQL and…
Variant
Platform
Used Against
nenc.cpp (v1)
Windows, CNG / AES-NI
AFRICA-TECH; FinSoft
nenc2.cpp (v2)
Windows, CNG
Staged against a medical-laboratory database server
nenc2l.cpp / nenc2l_main.cpp
Linux, OpenSSL EVP or tiny-AES-c
Dediserve
finenc3-5.ps1, denc.ps1, datasweep.ps1
PowerShell / .NET
FinSoft
FMC appliance stage
Cisco FMC (Linux), OpenSSL
Firewall-manager victims
n0n execution chain…
victims
23 organizations
Artificial intelligence-powered ransomware group 'n0n' has been identified, with 14 countries and 23 organizations involved in the attack, resulting in a ransom demand of 40 billion won..
The group's internal operations have been revealed, with the use of AI coding tools to create hundreds of attack scripts and a confirmed scope of operations targeting at least 14 countries and 23 organizations.
infrastructure
305 devices
Global security company, Global Security Company, has conducted an attack using 305 devices of global security devices... using stolen account credentials to infiltrate the internal network.
The research team confirmed that the attacker performed a multi-step authentication attack targeting the VPN service operated by 305 global security devices.
victims
93 victims
93 organizations have reported being attacked... with a total loss of $283,700,000.
organisation
Windows/Linux
Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
Uploads to a public file-hosting service
Impact
T1486
– Data Encrypted for Impact
n0n locker (Windows/Linux) and the OpenSSL stage on FMC appliances
Impact
T1485
– Data Destruction
S3 mass deletion; a provider’s servers and backups removed
Impact
T1490
– Inhibit System Recovery
Shadow copies deleted; free space wiped
Impact
T1489
– Service Stop
MSSQL, MySQL and…
organisation
AFRICA-TECH
Variant
Platform
Used Against
nenc.cpp (v1)
Windows, CNG / AES-NI
AFRICA-TECH; FinSoft
nenc2.cpp (v2)
Windows, CNG
Staged against a medical-laboratory database server
nenc2l.cpp / nenc2l_main.cpp
Linux, OpenSSL EVP or tiny-AES-c
Dediserve
finenc3-5.ps1, denc.ps1, datasweep.ps1
PowerShell / .NET
FinSoft
FMC appliance stage
Cisco FMC (Linux), OpenSSL
Firewall-manager victims
n0n execution chain…
organisation
Cisco FMC
Variant
Platform
Used Against
nenc.cpp (v1)
Windows, CNG / AES-NI
AFRICA-TECH; FinSoft
nenc2.cpp (v2)
Windows, CNG
Staged against a medical-laboratory database server
nenc2l.cpp / nenc2l_main.cpp
Linux, OpenSSL EVP or tiny-AES-c
Dediserve
finenc3-5.ps1, denc.ps1, datasweep.ps1
PowerShell / .NET
FinSoft
FMC appliance stage
Cisco FMC (Linux), OpenSSL
Firewall-manager victims
n0n execution chain…
organisation
C:\Users\Public\n0n\
Variant
Platform
Used Against
nenc.cpp (v1)
Windows, CNG / AES-NI
AFRICA-TECH; FinSoft
nenc2.cpp (v2)
Windows, CNG
Staged against a medical-laboratory database server
nenc2l.cpp / nenc2l_main.cpp
Linux, OpenSSL EVP or tiny-AES-c
Dediserve
finenc3-5.ps1, denc.ps1, datasweep.ps1
PowerShell / .NET
FinSoft
FMC appliance stage
Cisco FMC (Linux), OpenSSL
Firewall-manager victims
n0n execution chain…
organisation
Symantec Endpoint Protection
Variant
Platform
Used Against
nenc.cpp (v1)
Windows, CNG / AES-NI
AFRICA-TECH; FinSoft
nenc2.cpp (v2)
Windows, CNG
Staged against a medical-laboratory database server
nenc2l.cpp / nenc2l_main.cpp
Linux, OpenSSL EVP or tiny-AES-c
Dediserve
finenc3-5.ps1, denc.ps1, datasweep.ps1
PowerShell / .NET
FinSoft
FMC appliance stage
Cisco FMC (Linux), OpenSSL
Firewall-manager victims
n0n execution chain…
organisation
SvcSync
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Used by n0n
Tactic
Technique
Procedure
Reconnaissance
T1595.001
– Active Scanning: Scanning IP Blocks
RDP batch scans and a ranked list of 305 FortiGate SSL-VPN appliances
Initial Access
T1078
– Valid Accounts
Weak or default RDP/WinRM administrator credentials; firewall-manager admin accounts
Initial Access
T1078.004
– Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
Exposed long-liv…
organisation
NetAssist
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Used by n0n
Tactic
Technique
Procedure
Reconnaissance
T1595.001
– Active Scanning: Scanning IP Blocks
RDP batch scans and a ranked list of 305 FortiGate SSL-VPN appliances
Initial Access
T1078
– Valid Accounts
Weak or default RDP/WinRM administrator credentials; firewall-manager admin accounts
Initial Access
T1078.004
– Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
Exposed long-liv…
organisation
FMC
…0 for the cover accounts
Defense Evasion
T1070.004
– Indicator Removal: File Deletion
Toolkit overwritten three times and deleted; launchers self-delete
Credential Access
T1110.004
– Brute Force: Credential Stuffing
FortiGate /remote/logincheck credential stuffing via residential proxies (APBSID=n0n)
Credential Access
T1110.002
– Brute Force: Password Cracking
Offline cracking of stolen SaaS…
organisation
Credential Access
…0 for the cover accounts
Defense Evasion
T1070.004
– Indicator Removal: File Deletion
Toolkit overwritten three times and deleted; launchers self-delete
Credential Access
T1110.004
– Brute Force: Credential Stuffing
FortiGate /remote/logincheck credential stuffing via residential proxies (APBSID=n0n)
Credential Access
T1110.002
– Brute Force: Password Cracking
Offline cracking of stolen SaaS…
organisation
Chrome/Edge
…0 for the cover accounts
Defense Evasion
T1070.004
– Indicator Removal: File Deletion
Toolkit overwritten three times and deleted; launchers self-delete
Credential Access
T1110.004
– Brute Force: Credential Stuffing
FortiGate /remote/logincheck credential stuffing via residential proxies (APBSID=n0n)
Credential Access
T1110.002
– Brute Force: Password Cracking
Offline cracking of stolen SaaS…
organisation
Chrome
…0 for the cover accounts
Defense Evasion
T1070.004
– Indicator Removal: File Deletion
Toolkit overwritten three times and deleted; launchers self-delete
Credential Access
T1110.004
– Brute Force: Credential Stuffing
FortiGate /remote/logincheck credential stuffing via residential proxies (APBSID=n0n)
Credential Access
T1110.002
– Brute Force: Password Cracking
Offline cracking of stolen SaaS…
organisation
DevTools
…0 for the cover accounts
Defense Evasion
T1070.004
– Indicator Removal: File Deletion
Toolkit overwritten three times and deleted; launchers self-delete
Credential Access
T1110.004
– Brute Force: Credential Stuffing
FortiGate /remote/logincheck credential stuffing via residential proxies (APBSID=n0n)
Credential Access
T1110.002
– Brute Force: Password Cracking
Offline cracking of stolen SaaS…
victims
0 Hidden SpecialAccounts\UserList value
…0 for the cover accounts
Defense Evasion
T1070.004
– Indicator Removal: File Deletion
Toolkit overwritten three times and deleted; launchers self-delete
Credential Access
T1110.004
– Brute Force: Credential Stuffing
FortiGate /remote/logincheck credential stuffing via residential proxies (APBSID=n0n)
Credential Access
T1110.002
– Brute Force: Password Cracking
Offline cracking of stolen SaaS…
organisation
Command
…5985/1433
Discovery
T1580
– Cloud Infrastructure Discovery
EC2/ECS/SSM mapping and hosting-panel VM inventories
Discovery
T1619
– Cloud Storage Object Discovery
S3 bucket listing and prefix census
Lateral Movement
T1021.001
– Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol
Headless xfreerdp sessions driven by key injection and OCR
Lateral Movement
T1021.006
– Remote Services: Windows Remote Managem…
organisation
C2 (c2srv.py
…5985/1433
Discovery
T1580
– Cloud Infrastructure Discovery
EC2/ECS/SSM mapping and hosting-panel VM inventories
Discovery
T1619
– Cloud Storage Object Discovery
S3 bucket listing and prefix census
Lateral Movement
T1021.001
– Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol
Headless xfreerdp sessions driven by key injection and OCR
Lateral Movement
T1021.006
– Remote Services: Windows Remote Managem…
data_breach
1,719 files
The secured files total 1,719, with 829 being attack scripts.
infrastructure
829 scripts
The secured files total 1,719, with 829 being attack scripts.
organisation
SigV4
Data leaves through Base64-encoded ZIP POSTs to C2, SigV4 requests over Tor, SSH-tunneled TAR archives and public file-hosting services, and always ends up on monster under /root/harvest/<victim>/.
Encryption and Data Destruction
The n0n locker runs inside wrapper scripts that stop database and security services, delete shadow copies and wipe free space.
financial
$7,216
The cost of the AI models used by the group exceeded $7,216.
organisation
FortiManager
Restrict FortiManager and FMC interfaces with IP allow-lists and MFA, require formal approval for policy changes, remove shared or default credentials, and flag REST token creation from unknown IPs
Reduce cloud key risk:
Replace long-lived cloud keys with short-lived roles, keep list, read and delete S3 permissions off a single IAM identity, enable Object Lock and versioning, and alert on hig…
organisation
Object Lock
Restrict FortiManager and FMC interfaces with IP allow-lists and MFA, require formal approval for policy changes, remove shared or default credentials, and flag REST token creation from unknown IPs
Reduce cloud key risk:
Replace long-lived cloud keys with short-lived roles, keep list, read and delete S3 permissions off a single IAM identity, enable Object Lock and versioning, and alert on hig…
organisation
DeleteObjects
Restrict FortiManager and FMC interfaces with IP allow-lists and MFA, require formal approval for policy changes, remove shared or default credentials, and flag REST token creation from unknown IPs
Reduce cloud key risk:
Replace long-lived cloud keys with short-lived roles, keep list, read and delete S3 permissions off a single IAM identity, enable Object Lock and versioning, and alert on hig…
organisation
Keep
Restrict FortiManager and FMC interfaces with IP allow-lists and MFA, require formal approval for policy changes, remove shared or default credentials, and flag REST token creation from unknown IPs
Reduce cloud key risk:
Replace long-lived cloud keys with short-lived roles, keep list, read and delete S3 permissions off a single IAM identity, enable Object Lock and versioning, and alert on hig…
organisation
CloudTrail
…aS operators should run management portals from isolated workstations with hardware-backed session controls, and keep MFA passcodes out of local admin mailboxes
Hunt for n0n behavior:
Search EDR, CloudTrail, WinRM/RDP and firewall logs for the IOCs above and for C:\Users\Public\n0n\, .n0n renames after MSSQL/W3SVC/MySQL stops, SYSTEM tasks such as SvcSync or NetAssist, Chrome launched with –r…
Tactical Metrics
Metrics
victims
93
Victims
Click for context!
Tracking logged 93 victims across 27 countries, with the heaviest concentration in the United States and South Korea.
n0n is a data-exfiltration and destructive-extortion group that surfaced on the Dark Web in September 2026 and scaled to 93 listed victims within roughly five weeks.
An inspection of the leak portal on October 15, 2026, showed 93 targeted entities: 52 marked “exposed,” 21 “leaked,” 15 “pending,” and 5 “honored” after ransom payments.
By October 19, 2026, it had listed 93 victims with $283.7M in combined ransom demands.
As of October 19, the attack organization has posted information on its self-operated leak site about 93 victims, with a total of approximately $283,700,000 demanded in ransom.
93 organizations have reported being attacked... with a total loss of $283,700,000.
Metrics
infrastructure
Linux
Affected Product
Stolen admin browser credentials led to takeover of the provider’s management stack; the operator ran commands through Zabbix scripts and OnApp recipes named “disk usage check” and “maintenance check,” converted tenant backups into VM templates, and deployed the only Linux n0n locker variant
Inter (ISP, Venezuela):
…ervices:
Agent box (185.157.161[.]148):
Central staging node hosting the AI coding agent and the kserver C2 panel behind Cloudflare
raas (188.214.135[.]130):
Leak site backend, victim records, Electrum wallet, WinRM strike automation and C2 listeners
monster (81.161.239[.]10):
Loot vault where all exfiltration terminates, leak builder, implant tools and an HTTPS C2 listener
Seedbox:
Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
Uploads to a public file-hosting service
Impact
T1486
– Data Encrypted for Impact
n0n locker (Windows/Linux) and the OpenSSL stage on FMC appliances
Impact
T1485
– Data Destruction
S3 mass deletion; a provider’s servers and backups removed
Impact
T1490
– Inhibit System Recovery
Shadow copies deleted; free space wiped
Impact
T1489
– Service Stop
MSSQL, MySQL and…
Variant
Platform
Used Against
nenc.cpp (v1)
Windows, CNG / AES-NI
AFRICA-TECH; FinSoft
nenc2.cpp (v2)
Windows, CNG
Staged against a medical-laboratory database server
nenc2l.cpp / nenc2l_main.cpp
Linux, OpenSSL EVP or tiny-AES-c
Dediserve
finenc3-5.ps1, denc.ps1, datasweep.ps1
PowerShell / .NET
FinSoft
FMC appliance stage
Cisco FMC (Linux), OpenSSL
Firewall-manager victims
n0n execution chain…
The Linux variant is the most cautious build: it writes to a .n0n.tmp file, decrypts and verifies the result against an MD5 checksum, and only then renames the file.
Metrics
infrastructure
Fortigate
Affected Product
…es to BLOCK, and claimed to have severed national network traffic on September 18, 2026, alongside a 15 BTC demand
n0n’s note on its control of the Inter network
Fanatics (sports e-commerce, US):
An exposed AWS access key enabled exfiltration from 40 S3 buckets, followed by deletion of a bank-transaction archive and twelve confidential buckets without any encryptor; the group claimed 21…
The directory exposed the operation end to end: credential stuffing against FortiGate SSL-VPN appliances, hijacked firewall management centers, mass S3 deletion, a custom C++ locker, and an AI coding agent backed by more than $7,000 in paid LLM API usage.
Every documented intrusion relied on weak or compromised credentials:
FortiGate SSL-VPN credential stuffing:
A 15-thread routine through residential proxy pools against an index of 305 appliances, with every request carrying the header Cookie: APBSID=n0n
RDP and WinRM:
Sequential sweeps for default or weak passwords, driven by OCR-assisted RDP scripts
Cloud credentials:
Long-lived AWS…
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques Used by n0n
Tactic
Technique
Procedure
Reconnaissance
T1595.001
– Active Scanning: Scanning IP Blocks
RDP batch scans and a ranked list of 305 FortiGate SSL-VPN appliances
Initial Access
T1078
– Valid Accounts
Weak or default RDP/WinRM administrator credentials; firewall-manager admin accounts
Initial Access
T1078.004
– Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
Exposed long-liv…
…0 for the cover accounts
Defense Evasion
T1070.004
– Indicator Removal: File Deletion
Toolkit overwritten three times and deleted; launchers self-delete
Credential Access
T1110.004
– Brute Force: Credential Stuffing
FortiGate /remote/logincheck credential stuffing via residential proxies (APBSID=n0n)
Credential Access
T1110.002
– Brute Force: Password Cracking
Offline cracking of stolen SaaS…
The main vectors were FortiGate SSL-VPN credential stuffing against 305 appliances, RDP and WinRM password sweeps, exposed AWS IAM keys, hijacked hosting-provider browser sessions and secrets taken from SaaS and CI/CD pipelines.
Metrics
financial
₿15
Ransom Demand
…es to BLOCK, and claimed to have severed national network traffic on September 18, 2026, alongside a 15 BTC demand
n0n’s note on its control of the Inter network
Fanatics (sports e-commerce, US):
An exposed AWS access key enabled exfiltration from 40 S3 buckets, followed by deletion of a bank-transaction archive and twelve confidential buckets without any encryptor; the group claimed 21…
Metrics
data_breach
218
Gb
…es to BLOCK, and claimed to have severed national network traffic on September 18, 2026, alongside a 15 BTC demand
n0n’s note on its control of the Inter network
Fanatics (sports e-commerce, US):
An exposed AWS access key enabled exfiltration from 40 S3 buckets, followed by deletion of a bank-transaction archive and twelve confidential buckets without any encryptor; the group claimed 21…
Metrics
financial
₿30
Ransom Demand
…es to BLOCK, and claimed to have severed national network traffic on September 18, 2026, alongside a 15 BTC demand
n0n’s note on its control of the Inter network
Fanatics (sports e-commerce, US):
An exposed AWS access key enabled exfiltration from 40 S3 buckets, followed by deletion of a bank-transaction archive and twelve confidential buckets without any encryptor; the group claimed 21…
Metrics
financial
$7K
Payment
The directory exposed the operation end to end: credential stuffing against FortiGate SSL-VPN appliances, hijacked firewall management centers, mass S3 deletion, a custom C++ locker, and an AI coding agent backed by more than $7,000 in paid LLM API usage.
Metrics
infrastructure
Windows
Affected Product
…ervices:
Agent box (185.157.161[.]148):
Central staging node hosting the AI coding agent and the kserver C2 panel behind Cloudflare
raas (188.214.135[.]130):
Leak site backend, victim records, Electrum wallet, WinRM strike automation and C2 listeners
monster (81.161.239[.]10):
Loot vault where all exfiltration terminates, leak builder, implant tools and an HTTPS C2 listener
Seedbox:
Creation of the hidden admin account svc_upd
Exfiltration
Each victim gets a dedicated pipeline with per-target byte budgets, from 1 GB to 110 GB per cloud bucket and an 8 GiB cap for in-band Windows exfiltration.
…5985/1433
Discovery
T1580
– Cloud Infrastructure Discovery
EC2/ECS/SSM mapping and hosting-panel VM inventories
Discovery
T1619
– Cloud Storage Object Discovery
S3 bucket listing and prefix census
Lateral Movement
T1021.001
– Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol
Headless xfreerdp sessions driven by key injection and OCR
Lateral Movement
T1021.006
– Remote Services: Windows Remote Managem…
Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
Uploads to a public file-hosting service
Impact
T1486
– Data Encrypted for Impact
n0n locker (Windows/Linux) and the OpenSSL stage on FMC appliances
Impact
T1485
– Data Destruction
S3 mass deletion; a provider’s servers and backups removed
Impact
T1490
– Inhibit System Recovery
Shadow copies deleted; free space wiped
Impact
T1489
– Service Stop
MSSQL, MySQL and…
Variant
Platform
Used Against
nenc.cpp (v1)
Windows, CNG / AES-NI
AFRICA-TECH; FinSoft
nenc2.cpp (v2)
Windows, CNG
Staged against a medical-laboratory database server
nenc2l.cpp / nenc2l_main.cpp
Linux, OpenSSL EVP or tiny-AES-c
Dediserve
finenc3-5.ps1, denc.ps1, datasweep.ps1
PowerShell / .NET
FinSoft
FMC appliance stage
Cisco FMC (Linux), OpenSSL
Firewall-manager victims
n0n execution chain…
The attack utilized remote desktop (RDP), Windows remote management (WinRM), exposed cloud access keys, and stolen administrator accounts.
Metrics
infrastructure
185.157.161
Software Version
…ervices:
Agent box (185.157.161[.]148):
Central staging node hosting the AI coding agent and the kserver C2 panel behind Cloudflare
raas (188.214.135[.]130):
Leak site backend, victim records, Electrum wallet, WinRM strike automation and C2 listeners
monster (81.161.239[.]10):
Loot vault where all exfiltration terminates, leak builder, implant tools and an HTTPS C2 listener
Seedbox:
Metrics
infrastructure
188.214.135
Software Version
…ervices:
Agent box (185.157.161[.]148):
Central staging node hosting the AI coding agent and the kserver C2 panel behind Cloudflare
raas (188.214.135[.]130):
Leak site backend, victim records, Electrum wallet, WinRM strike automation and C2 listeners
monster (81.161.239[.]10):
Loot vault where all exfiltration terminates, leak builder, implant tools and an HTTPS C2 listener
Seedbox:
Metrics
infrastructure
81.161.239
Software Version
…ervices:
Agent box (185.157.161[.]148):
Central staging node hosting the AI coding agent and the kserver C2 panel behind Cloudflare
raas (188.214.135[.]130):
Leak site backend, victim records, Electrum wallet, WinRM strike automation and C2 listeners
monster (81.161.239[.]10):
Loot vault where all exfiltration terminates, leak builder, implant tools and an HTTPS C2 listener
Seedbox:
Metrics
data_breach
1,719
Files
…ervices:
Agent box (185.157.161[.]148):
Central staging node hosting the AI coding agent and the kserver C2 panel behind Cloudflare
raas (188.214.135[.]130):
Leak site backend, victim records, Electrum wallet, WinRM strike automation and C2 listeners
monster (81.161.239[.]10):
Loot vault where all exfiltration terminates, leak builder, implant tools and an HTTPS C2 listener
Seedbox:
The secured files total 1,719, with 829 being attack scripts.
Metrics
infrastructure
829
Scripts
…ervices:
Agent box (185.157.161[.]148):
Central staging node hosting the AI coding agent and the kserver C2 panel behind Cloudflare
raas (188.214.135[.]130):
Leak site backend, victim records, Electrum wallet, WinRM strike automation and C2 listeners
monster (81.161.239[.]10):
Loot vault where all exfiltration terminates, leak builder, implant tools and an HTTPS C2 listener
Seedbox:
The secured files total 1,719, with 829 being attack scripts.
Metrics
infrastructure
207
Shell Scripts
…ervices:
Agent box (185.157.161[.]148):
Central staging node hosting the AI coding agent and the kserver C2 panel behind Cloudflare
raas (188.214.135[.]130):
Leak site backend, victim records, Electrum wallet, WinRM strike automation and C2 listeners
monster (81.161.239[.]10):
Loot vault where all exfiltration terminates, leak builder, implant tools and an HTTPS C2 listener
Seedbox:
Metrics
data_breach
1
Gb
Creation of the hidden admin account svc_upd
Exfiltration
Each victim gets a dedicated pipeline with per-target byte budgets, from 1 GB to 110 GB per cloud bucket and an 8 GiB cap for in-band Windows exfiltration.
Metrics
data_breach
110
Gb
Creation of the hidden admin account svc_upd
Exfiltration
Each victim gets a dedicated pipeline with per-target byte budgets, from 1 GB to 110 GB per cloud bucket and an 8 GiB cap for in-band Windows exfiltration.
Metrics
infrastructure
46
Servers
Destruction is a deliberate lever on its own: the operator purges source files after exfiltration, flips firewall rules to BLOCK, and in one case claimed to have removed 46 servers and their backups.
Metrics
victims
0
Hidden Specialaccounts\Userlist Value
…0 for the cover accounts
Defense Evasion
T1070.004
– Indicator Removal: File Deletion
Toolkit overwritten three times and deleted; launchers self-delete
Credential Access
T1110.004
– Brute Force: Credential Stuffing
FortiGate /remote/logincheck credential stuffing via residential proxies (APBSID=n0n)
Credential Access
T1110.002
– Brute Force: Password Cracking
Offline cracking of stolen SaaS…
Metrics
victims
10
Organizations
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
Metrics
victims
3
Organizations
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
Metrics
victims
2
Organizations
Activity
September 17
Negotiation portals opened
September 18
Network of Venezuelan ISP Inter severed
September 23-25
First leak wave (10 organizations)
September 25-26
Exposed staging server identified by STRU
September 27-29
Second leak wave (3 organizations)
October 1-2
Third leak wave (2 organizations)
October 5-7
Two settlements marked “honored”
October 12
38 maritime, port and logistics or…
Metrics
data_breach
33
Bytes
At FinSoft, the first two PowerShell versions failed because a Base64 key decoded to 33 bytes, and a third version fixed the bug mid-attack.
Metrics
financial
$7.2K
Cost
Billing records confirm active use of three gateways, and key-status checks show more than $7,216 in API spending as of October 22, 2026, with spending focused mainly on safety-removed models.
The operator uses the opencode AI coding agent with 154 configured models, including uncensored and safety-removed models and a self-hosted Qwen 27B model, and spent more than $7,216 on LLM APIs by October 22, 2026.
The cost of the AI models used by the group exceeded $7,216.
Metrics
financial
₿0.5
Ransom Demand
Demands ranged from 0.5 BTC for a government ministry to 33.04 BTC for the United Federation of Teachers.
Metrics
financial
₿33
Financial Impact
Demands ranged from 0.5 BTC for a government ministry to 33.04 BTC for the United Federation of Teachers.
Metrics
financial
$400K
Ransom Demand
On October 12, 2026, n0n listed 38 maritime, port and logistics organizations across 18 countries in a single batch, with demands from $0.4M to $28M and a combined $275.8M. Maritime security research tied at least 21 of the 38 to customers of South Korean maritime software provider CyberLogitec, but CyberLogitec has not confirmed an incident, and one listing reuses another victim’s sample file,…
Metrics
financial
$28M
Ransom Demand
On October 12, 2026, n0n listed 38 maritime, port and logistics organizations across 18 countries in a single batch, with demands from $0.4M to $28M and a combined $275.8M. Maritime security research tied at least 21 of the 38 to customers of South Korean maritime software provider CyberLogitec, but CyberLogitec has not confirmed an incident, and one listing reuses another victim’s sample file,…
Metrics
financial
$284M
Ransom
By October 19, 2026, it had listed 93 victims with $283.7M in combined ransom demands.
Metrics
victims
23
Organizations
The findings tie the workspace to at least 23 organizations across 14 countries.
The staging server’s data covers 23 organizations across 14 countries in 15 distinct sectors, with Software/SaaS and retail tied at three victims each.
Artificial intelligence-powered ransomware group 'n0n' has been identified, with 14 countries and 23 organizations involved in the attack, resulting in a ransom demand of 40 billion won..
The group's internal operations have been revealed, with the use of AI coding tools to create hundreds of attack scripts and a confirmed scope of operations targeting at least 14 countries and 23 organizations.
Metrics
data_breach
32
Byte
Each build uses a single hardcoded 32-byte key.
Each n0n build uses a single hardcoded 32-byte key, and the same key appears in two builds used against different victims, so one victim’s decryptor would likely decrypt another’s files.
Metrics
victims
15
Distinct Sectors
The staging server’s data covers 23 organizations across 14 countries in 15 distinct sectors, with Software/SaaS and retail tied at three victims each.
Metrics
infrastructure
305
Devices
Global security company, Global Security Company, has conducted an attack using 305 devices of global security devices... using stolen account credentials to infiltrate the internal network.
The research team confirmed that the attacker performed a multi-step authentication attack targeting the VPN service operated by 305 global security devices.
Intelligence Sources
Dailysecu
2026-10-28
SOCRadar CTI Blog
2026-11-12
Dark Web Profile: n0n Ransomware
SOCRadar CTI Blog
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Tactical Intelligence
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Incident Version History
CURRENT VERSION
Last Updated: 2026-11-14T11:34
Comprehensive Tactical Telemetry
Highly Correlated Entities
60x
tactic
MITRE ATT&CK Technique
T1059.006 - Python
technique
53x
organisation
Identified Entity
Decoy
entity
25x
timeline
Temporal Reference
October 19
date
7x
tactic
Cyber Operation Type
Exfiltration
tactic
5x
target region
Target Country
United States
country
5x
financial
Ransom Demand
₿15
4x
industry
Targeted Sector
Logistics
sector
4x
victims
Organizations
10
organizations
3x
general metric
Countries
27
countries
3x
infrastructure
Affected Product
Linux
software
3x
data breach
Gb
218
gb
3x
infrastructure
Software Version
185.157.161
version
Contextual Telemetry
Context Block
34 METRICS
victims
Victims
93
victims
general metric
S3 Buckets
40
s3 buckets
financial
Payment
$7K
general metric
%
10
%
data breach
Files
1,719
files
infrastructure
Scripts
829
scripts
general metric
Python
589
python
general metric
Powershell
28
powershell
infrastructure
Shell Scripts
207
shell scripts
general metric
C++ Encryptor Sources
5
c++ encryptor sources
general metric
Appliances
305
appliances
general metric
Gib Cap
8
gib cap
infrastructure
Servers
46
servers
victims
Hidden Specialaccounts\Userlist Value
0
hidden specialaccounts\userlist value
general metric
Counter
176,901
counter
target region
Target Region
AFRICA
region
general metric
Exposed Pending
15
exposed pending
threat actor
APT Group
Silence
actor
general metric
Addresses
55
addresses
general metric
Maritime Listings
38
maritime listings
data breach
Bytes
33
bytes
general metric
Model Entries
154
model entries
general metric
Providers
7
providers
financial
Cost
$7.2K
general metric
Site
4
site
financial
Financial Impact
₿33
general metric
Research
21
research
financial
Ransom
$284M
general metric
Hours
96
hours
data breach
Byte
32
byte
victims
Distinct Sectors
15
distinct sectors
general metric
Won
40,000,000,000
won
infrastructure
Devices
305
devices
general metric
Locations
23
locations
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