INSPECTING ARCHIVED INTELLIGENCE (OUTDATED VERSION).
ShadowCloud attackers breach government networks via cloud service backdoors
|
2026-11-17 08:00
MEDIUM
HIGH
MALWARE & BOTNETS
Executive Summary
AI-generated
On November 17, 2026, a cloud service-based backdoor operation dubbed Operation ShadowCloud targeted government networks in Asia and Africa. The identified entity behind the attack is attributed to Chinese-speaking threat groups. A total of 27 IP addresses were compromised by this campaign. The initial infection stage involved using GitHub as a command-and-control (C2) server for the GitDoor backdoor, which loaded various shellcode families onto infected hosts. In part two of the analysis, the GraphDoor backdoor and additional plug-ins were discussed, including patched Erfrp and Ably proxy plug-ins. The current status indicates that threat actors continue to use these cloud service-based backdoors to maintain access to compromised networks.
Technical Observables 82 IoCs Login Required
Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) Protected
Raw threat telemetry, malicious IP addresses, file hashes, and direct VirusTotal correlation are restricted to authenticated users.
ips 23
md5 21
domains 3
files 35
Intelligence Metadata
Actors / Malware / CVEs / Campaigns
Operation ShadowCloudOperation ShadowCloud
GitDoorGitDoorGraphDoorGraphDoor
Target & Sectors
AFRICA
AFRICA
governmentgovernment
Incident Timeline
2026/11/17
Threat actors used legitimate cloud platforms, including Microsoft SharePoint and GitHub, to deliver a keylogger plug-in that blended in with normal traffic.
Click on any entity below to view its context and source!
infrastructure
Windows
….exe"
"execution_method"
:
"1"
"is_need_lock"
:
"false"
Victim
Information
Public
IP
Internal
IP
Domain
Username
Hostname
Current
working
directory
Backdoor
process
name
and
process
ID
Windows
version
CPU
type
Running
process
name
The backdoor builds a random eight‑character identifier that uniquely tags the compromised host and creates a fresh GUID to mark the active…
For each task found, it retrieves: task name, task path, enabled status, last run time, next run time, current state
CreateTask
: creates a new Windows scheduled task using the Task Scheduler COM API
RunTask
: executes a Windows scheduled task using the Task Scheduler COM API
Registry Activity
Registry CLI:
Enumerates Windows Registry keys and values recursively
Reads a re…
It uses the following arguments:
sekurlsa::logonpasswords full
is a command in the Mimikatz tool used to extract usernames, NTLM hashes, and cleartext passwords from the Windows LSASS memory space.
infrastructure
1.1 Host
organisation
GraphDoor
Part 2 provides details on the GraphDoor backdoor and the plug-in suite (Keylogging, Process Listing, Screen Capturing, Modified Erfrp Proxy, and Ably Channel Proxy) and examines the evidence that points to links with Chinese‑speaking threat groups.
In this part, we will walk through the GraphDoor backdoor and the suite of plug-ins loaded, including patched Erfrp and Ably proxy plug-ins, and highlight the attribution clues that tie the operation to Chinese‑speaking threat groups.
In part 2 of our analysis of the recently uncovered Operation ShadowCloud, we discuss the GraphDoor backdoor, additional plug-ins, and technical attribution.
organisation
GitDoor
In part 1 of our analysis of the recently uncovered Operation ShadowCloud, we discuss the initial infection stage, the GitDoor backdoor using GitHub as a C2, and the shellcode families it loads.
We also highlight the attribution clues:
This article (Part 1 of the story) deals with the initial infection vector, the GitDoor backdoor, and various shellcode families the threat actor drops onto target machines.
Introduction
The first part of the blog focused on the initial infection chain, examined the GitDoor backdoor’s command‑and‑control protocol, and cataloged the diverse shellcode families the actors drop onto compromised hosts.
organisation
GitHub
…hongyi Avenue)
38[.]54[.]17[.]113
NA
NA
NA
AS 154177 (LIGHT NODE LIMITED)
38[.]52[.]17[.]113
NA
NA
NA
AS 33152 (Kit Carson Electric Cooperative, Inc)
Conclusion
The discovery of Operation ShadowCloud reveals a sophisticated, modular threat infrastructure leveraging legitimate cloud platforms – Microsoft SharePoint, GitHub, and Ably – as stealthy C2 channels.
These implants hide their command‑and‑control (C2) traffic behind cloud services
Microsoft SharePoint, GitHub, and Ably
, allowing the implants to blend in with normal traffic, effectively evading network-based detections.
organisation
MeshCentral
Initial infection
During our investigation, we uncovered two separate instances of the MeshCentral Agent (MD5: 74b025084026d8d9a64661bf995d835b), which were launched inside a Taiwanese organization.
While it’s unclear at the time of writing this report how the threat actors initially dropped the MeshCentral Agent, introducing such legitimate tools to an environment should be treated as a suspicious event; although such tools have legitimate uses, they have already been abused by different threat actor types globally.
organisation
Microsoft
These implants hide their command‑and‑control (C2) traffic behind cloud services
Microsoft SharePoint, GitHub, and Ably
, allowing the implants to blend in with normal traffic, effectively evading network-based detections.
It issues a Microsoft Graph PUT request that creates a file called
main.%victim‑unique‑code%.js.map
, masquerading as a JavaScript source map file, in a SharePoint document library.
organisation
SharePoint
These implants hide their command‑and‑control (C2) traffic behind cloud services
Microsoft SharePoint, GitHub, and Ably
, allowing the implants to blend in with normal traffic, effectively evading network-based detections.
It issues a Microsoft Graph PUT request that creates a file called
main.%victim‑unique‑code%.js.map
, masquerading as a JavaScript source map file, in a SharePoint document library.
organisation
Token
The configuration contains the Ably ChannelName and Token.
Token and channel name extraction:
if that string contains the keyword “Token”, it is parsed as JSON to pull out two fields:
Ably JWT token: used for authentication
Channel name: the Ably channel that will be used for communication
Connection setup:
a client ID of the form
cli‑<%PID%>
is built, the JWT token is supplied, and a secure real‑time connection to Ably is opened.
organisation
COFF
organisation
Screen Capturing
Part 2 provides details on the GraphDoor backdoor and the plug-in suite (Keylogging, Process Listing, Screen Capturing, Modified Erfrp Proxy, and Ably Channel Proxy) and examines the evidence that points to links with Chinese‑speaking threat groups.
organisation
Chrome, Edge
Keylogging
Writes keystrokes to a file at the following path: %APPDATA%\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Cache\logs.dat
Browser Cookie Stealer
Uses CookieKatz to dump cookies from Chrome, Edge, or Msedgewebview2 directly from the process memory
Credential Dumping
Mimikatz: the tool is named imzimzgo 2.2.0 x64.
organisation
Keylogger
Command type
Example GitHub path
Load Shellcode command
/repos/LatonyCharnleyaW/Havo/contents/main.w8i6lyr9.rikh.js
Keylogger command
/repos/LatonyCharnleyaW/Havo/contents/main.r256zin8.xuqa.js.kmap
Proxy command
/repos/LatonyCharnleyaW/Havo/contents/main.
organisation
Filemanager
GitHub path
Output Type
/repos/LatonyCharnleyaW/Trix/contents/main.wdlwkho0.q94e.js.kmap
Keylogger command output
/repos/LatonyCharnleyaW/Trix/contents/main.13g2vvwp.t17e.js.pmap
Proxy command output
/repos/LatonyCharnleyaW/Trix/contents/main.w5y2t1qs.1s6b.js.apmap
Ably proxy command output
/repos/LatonyCharnleyaW/Trix/contents/main.wqktoqxf.ymlj.js.tmp
Filemana…
organisation
BrainStorm Network, Inc
…NA
AS 14956 (RouterHosting LLC)
216[.]73[.]158[.]72
NA
NA
NA
AS 53724 (EXTRAVM LLC)
122[.]147[.]252[.]16
NA
NA
NA
AS 9919 (New Century InfoComm Tech Co., Ltd.)
103[.]106[.]230[.]33
google
1qaz2wsx-pl
ms[.]twnic[.]top
AS 136258 (BrainStorm Network, Inc)
123[.]58[.]205[.]105
google
1qaz2wsx-pl
ekmt[.]tw
AS 135377 (UCLOUD INFORMATION TECH…
organisation
UCLOUD INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
…NA
AS 14956 (RouterHosting LLC)
216[.]73[.]158[.]72
NA
NA
NA
AS 53724 (EXTRAVM LLC)
122[.]147[.]252[.]16
NA
NA
NA
AS 9919 (New Century InfoComm Tech Co., Ltd.)
103[.]106[.]230[.]33
google
1qaz2wsx-pl
ms[.]twnic[.]top
AS 136258 (BrainStorm Network, Inc)
123[.]58[.]205[.]105
google
1qaz2wsx-pl
ekmt[.]tw
AS 135377 (UCLOUD INFORMATION TECH…
organisation
Type 2 Loader
Type 2 Loader (MD5 e63ec733393e4e7e3424cbff918003a3)
This loader is internally named SbieDll_st.dll.
infrastructure
1.1.6
….exe"
"execution_method"
:
"1"
"is_need_lock"
:
"false"
Victim
Information
Public
IP
Internal
IP
Domain
Username
Hostname
Current
working
directory
Backdoor
process
name
and
process
ID
Windows
version
CPU
type
Running
process
name
The backdoor builds a random eight‑character identifier that uniquely tags the compromised host and creates a fresh GUID to mark the active…
organisation
Enumerates Windows Registry
For each task found, it retrieves: task name, task path, enabled status, last run time, next run time, current state
CreateTask
: creates a new Windows scheduled task using the Task Scheduler COM API
RunTask
: executes a Windows scheduled task using the Task Scheduler COM API
Registry Activity
Registry CLI:
Enumerates Windows Registry keys and values recursively
Reads a re…
organisation
RegQueryValueExW
For each task found, it retrieves: task name, task path, enabled status, last run time, next run time, current state
CreateTask
: creates a new Windows scheduled task using the Task Scheduler COM API
RunTask
: executes a Windows scheduled task using the Task Scheduler COM API
Registry Activity
Registry CLI:
Enumerates Windows Registry keys and values recursively
Reads a re…
organisation
the Windows Registry
For each task found, it retrieves: task name, task path, enabled status, last run time, next run time, current state
CreateTask
: creates a new Windows scheduled task using the Task Scheduler COM API
RunTask
: executes a Windows scheduled task using the Task Scheduler COM API
Registry Activity
Registry CLI:
Enumerates Windows Registry keys and values recursively
Reads a re…
organisation
AddUser
For each task found, it retrieves: task name, task path, enabled status, last run time, next run time, current state
CreateTask
: creates a new Windows scheduled task using the Task Scheduler COM API
RunTask
: executes a Windows scheduled task using the Task Scheduler COM API
Registry Activity
Registry CLI:
Enumerates Windows Registry keys and values recursively
Reads a re…
victims
4 users Mode
For each task found, it retrieves: task name, task path, enabled status, last run time, next run time, current state
CreateTask
: creates a new Windows scheduled task using the Task Scheduler COM API
RunTask
: executes a Windows scheduled task using the Task Scheduler COM API
Registry Activity
Registry CLI:
Enumerates Windows Registry keys and values recursively
Reads a re…
organisation
CC E7 B1
After the encrypted key, a fixed 32‑byte marker (53 4D C2 A1 3F 95 26 B7 2C 54 86 9A 02 87 A9 08 70 4B 5D B9 75 DD 8B 03 4B 0A 2B 89 25 CC E7 B1) is added to signal the beginning of the keylogger’s data.
organisation
the Windows
lsadump::sam
is a command in the Mimikatz tool used to extract local user account NT and LM password hashes from the Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) database.
organisation
SAM
lsadump::sam
is a command in the Mimikatz tool used to extract local user account NT and LM password hashes from the Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) database.
organisation
Operation ShadowCloud
…hongyi Avenue)
38[.]54[.]17[.]113
NA
NA
NA
AS 154177 (LIGHT NODE LIMITED)
38[.]52[.]17[.]113
NA
NA
NA
AS 33152 (Kit Carson Electric Cooperative, Inc)
Conclusion
The discovery of Operation ShadowCloud reveals a sophisticated, modular threat infrastructure leveraging legitimate cloud platforms – Microsoft SharePoint, GitHub, and Ably – as stealthy C2 channels.
organisation
Dedicated.com
…hongyi Avenue)
38[.]54[.]17[.]113
NA
NA
NA
AS 154177 (LIGHT NODE LIMITED)
38[.]52[.]17[.]113
NA
NA
NA
AS 33152 (Kit Carson Electric Cooperative, Inc)
Conclusion
The discovery of Operation ShadowCloud reveals a sophisticated, modular threat infrastructure leveraging legitimate cloud platforms – Microsoft SharePoint, GitHub, and Ably – as stealthy C2 channels.
organisation
The Constant Company
…hongyi Avenue)
38[.]54[.]17[.]113
NA
NA
NA
AS 154177 (LIGHT NODE LIMITED)
38[.]52[.]17[.]113
NA
NA
NA
AS 33152 (Kit Carson Electric Cooperative, Inc)
Conclusion
The discovery of Operation ShadowCloud reveals a sophisticated, modular threat infrastructure leveraging legitimate cloud platforms – Microsoft SharePoint, GitHub, and Ably – as stealthy C2 channels.
organisation
Tencent Building
…hongyi Avenue)
38[.]54[.]17[.]113
NA
NA
NA
AS 154177 (LIGHT NODE LIMITED)
38[.]52[.]17[.]113
NA
NA
NA
AS 33152 (Kit Carson Electric Cooperative, Inc)
Conclusion
The discovery of Operation ShadowCloud reveals a sophisticated, modular threat infrastructure leveraging legitimate cloud platforms – Microsoft SharePoint, GitHub, and Ably – as stealthy C2 channels.
Tactical Metrics
Metrics
infrastructure
Windows
Affected Product
Click for context!
Once the C2 session was established, the adversary used the agent to drop three additional items on the endpoint:
A legitimate binary
used for DLL sideloading
A malicious loader DLL
responsible for unpacking and executing further code
An encrypted file
containing the core payload
1st
Instance
C
:
\
windows
\
system32
\
start
.
exe
:
legitimate
Sandboxie
Start
binary
C
:
\
windows
\
system32
\
sbiedll
.
dll
:
malicious
loader
C
:
\
windows
\
system32
\
config
.
ini
:
encrypted
backdoor
file
2nd
Instance
C
:
\
Windows
\
system32
\
dts
\
pc
\
apo4x
\
dtsapo4service
.
exe
:
legitimate
Python
application
binary
C
:
\
Windows
\
System32
\
dts
\
pc
\
apo4x
\
python39
.
dll
:
malicious
loader
C
:
\
Windows
\
system32
\
dts
\
pc
\
apo4x
\
config
.
…spective legitimate binaries: the OpenJDK platform binary (javaw.exe, MD5: 8b78ef5609d942036e93721d75bd1f29), Sandboxie Start (start.exe, MD5: be739a7036dc8e2ee8608fba13c8c3a4), a Python application (pythonw.exe, MD5: 84802caf2579cfe7a38f079a64a3cd22), and the Sysinternals Screen Magnifier tool (zoomit.exe, MD5: d955d03104f988582cbd2967177693d3), which the attackers started as a Windows service.
Before allocating memory and executing the backdoor code, the loader checks the OS version; on Windows 8 (6.2) or newer, it uses the native APIs
NtAllocateVirtualMemory
,
RtlMoveMemory
, and
NtCreateThreadEx
for memory allocation and code execution, while on older systems it falls back to the standard APIs
VirtualAlloc
,
RtlMoveMemory
, and
CreateThread
.
Mozilla
/
5.0
(
Windows
NT
10.0
;
Win64
;
x64
)
….exe"
"execution_method"
:
"1"
"is_need_lock"
:
"false"
Victim
Information
Public
IP
Internal
IP
Domain
Username
Hostname
Current
working
directory
Backdoor
process
name
and
process
ID
Windows
version
CPU
type
Running
process
name
The backdoor builds a random eight‑character identifier that uniquely tags the compromised host and creates a fresh GUID to mark the active…
com
Authorization
:
token
%
github_pat_token
%
Accept
:
application
/
json
User
-
Agent
:
Mozilla
/
5.0
(
Windows
NT
10.0
;
Win64
;
x64
)
github
.
raw
+
json
User
-
Agent
:
Mozilla
/
5.0
(
Windows
NT
10.0
;
Win64
;
x64
)
github
.
raw
+
json
User
-
Agent
:
Mozilla
/
5.0
(
Windows
NT
10.0
;
Win64
;
x64
)
…rational logic, these shellcodes can be grouped into the following broad categories:
Category
Shellcode modules
Process Injection Techniques
CreateRemoteThread
: implements the Windows remote‑thread creation technique for process injection
SetThreadContext injection (Thread Execution Hijacking)
: implements the Windows thread context manipulation technique for remote code…
…inary path, start type, dependencies
Extended properties: reset period, reboot messages, command lines
Service dependencies: UUID-based dependency information
CreateService
: creates a new Windows service using the Windows Service Control Manager API
start_service
: starts a Windows service
stop_service
: stops a Windows service and, if necessary, its dependent services
DeleteSer…
Writes the formatted command (Add carriage return and Add null terminator) to the pipe
Scheduled Task Activity
EnumTasks
: enumerates Windows scheduled tasks (Task Scheduler jobs) and displays detailed information about each task.
For each task found, it retrieves: task name, task path, enabled status, last run time, next run time, current state
CreateTask
: creates a new Windows scheduled task using the Task Scheduler COM API
RunTask
: executes a Windows scheduled task using the Task Scheduler COM API
Registry Activity
Registry CLI:
Enumerates Windows Registry keys and values recursively
Reads a re…
It uses the following arguments:
sekurlsa::logonpasswords full
is a command in the Mimikatz tool used to extract usernames, NTLM hashes, and cleartext passwords from the Windows LSASS memory space.
lsadump::sam
is a command in the Mimikatz tool used to extract local user account NT and LM password hashes from the Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) database.
…he launched process
Creates an RPC binding using the parameters below:
UUID: df1941c5-fe89-4e79-bf10-463657acf44d – \PIPE\efsrpc
Protocol: ncacn_np
Address: 127.0.0.1
Creates the Windows UNC path \\localhost\pipe\<%random 8 chars%>\C$\hiddenfile.txt.
Invokes the specified EFSRPC operation (like EfsRpcOpenFileRaw), passing the UNC path as one of the parameters
Mis…
It resolves the needed Windows APIs at runtime by hashing DLL and function names with the DJB2 algorithm.
com
Accept
:
application
/
json
User
-
Agent
:
Mozilla
/
5.0
(
Windows
NT
10.0
;
Win64
;
x64
)
The plug-in is a compiled Windows executable, and its execution starts at the “MZ” bytes, which serve as trampoline code that redirects control to the bootstrap code.
Metrics
data_breach
16
Byte
Type 1 Loader (MD5 32151547d912488ac5242731057170a3)
The loader jli.dll reads the file config.ini (MD5: 3896d44bc6d517291c60ee3f70543a31) located next to it using the native NtCreateFile/NtReadFile calls, then it transforms the obtained data through the following steps to generate the final backdoor:
Base64‑decodes the data with a custom character set (
ABCDEFGHIJ01234ZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKzyxwv…
Metrics
infrastructure
6.2
Software Version
Before allocating memory and executing the backdoor code, the loader checks the OS version; on Windows 8 (6.2) or newer, it uses the native APIs
NtAllocateVirtualMemory
,
RtlMoveMemory
, and
NtCreateThreadEx
for memory allocation and code execution, while on older systems it falls back to the standard APIs
VirtualAlloc
,
RtlMoveMemory
, and
CreateThread
.
Metrics
infrastructure
1.1.6
Software Version
….exe"
"execution_method"
:
"1"
"is_need_lock"
:
"false"
Victim
Information
Public
IP
Internal
IP
Domain
Username
Hostname
Current
working
directory
Backdoor
process
name
and
process
ID
Windows
version
CPU
type
Running
process
name
The backdoor builds a random eight‑character identifier that uniquely tags the compromised host and creates a fresh GUID to mark the active…
Metrics
victims
4
Users Mode
For each task found, it retrieves: task name, task path, enabled status, last run time, next run time, current state
CreateTask
: creates a new Windows scheduled task using the Task Scheduler COM API
RunTask
: executes a Windows scheduled task using the Task Scheduler COM API
Registry Activity
Registry CLI:
Enumerates Windows Registry keys and values recursively
Reads a re…
Metrics
data_breach
8
Chars%>\C$\Hiddenfile.Txt
…he launched process
Creates an RPC binding using the parameters below:
UUID: df1941c5-fe89-4e79-bf10-463657acf44d – \PIPE\efsrpc
Protocol: ncacn_np
Address: 127.0.0.1
Creates the Windows UNC path \\localhost\pipe\<%random 8 chars%>\C$\hiddenfile.txt.
Invokes the specified EFSRPC operation (like EfsRpcOpenFileRaw), passing the UNC path as one of the parameters
Mis…
Metrics
infrastructure
1
Host
rd
=
%
random
alphanumeric
characters
%
HTTP
/
1.1
Host
:
api
.
Havo
/
contents
HTTP
/
1.1
Host
:
api
.
0
/
token
HTTP
/
1.1
Host
:
login
.
map
:
/
content
HTTP
/
1.1
Host
:
graph
.
sharepoint
[
.
]
com
,
bbd13fe9
-
7971
-
4091
-
85b4
-
19e19a02f0d3
,
615825b3
-
4c44
-
473a
-
8e85
-
07a9e27900ab
/
lists
/
dd27e665
-
bef6
-
4de1
-
b28f
-
280c0af4593f
/
items
?
select
=
id
,
fields
&
expand
=
fields
(
select
=
Title
,
text
,
Modified
,
Created
)
&
filter
=
startswith
(
fields
/
Title
,
'scr.ts'
)
HTTP
/
1.1
Host
:
graph
.
sharepoint
[
.
]
com
,
bbd13fe9
-
7971
-
4091
-
85b4
-
19e19a02f0d3
,
615825b3
-
4c44
-
473a
-
8e85
-
07a9e27900ab
/
lists
/
dd27e665
-
bef6
-
4de1
-
b28f
-
280c0af4593f
/
items
?
select
=
id
,
fields
&
expand
=
fields
(
select
=
Title
,
text
,
Modified
,
Created
)
&
filter
=
startswith
(
fields
/
Title
,
'kl.ts'
)
HTTP
/
1.1
Host
:
graph
.
Metrics
infrastructure
1.2.7
Software Version
"type":"serv"
"client_version":"1.2.7"
"dhj_exe":"javaw.exe"
"execution_method":"normal"
"is_need_lock":"false"
The malware first opens a TLS connection to
login.microsoftonline.com
on port 443.
Metrics
data_breach
33,792
Bytes
The data read from the remote TCP socket is split into 0x8400‑byte (33,792 bytes) blocks.
Intelligence Sources
AlienVault OTX
2026-11-17
Kaspersky
2026-11-17
Kaspersky
2026-11-17
AlienVault OTX
2026-11-17
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Incident Version History
CURRENT VERSION
Last Updated: 2026-11-17T11:43
Comprehensive Tactical Telemetry
Highly Correlated Entities
88x
organisation
Identified Entity
GraphDoor
entity
11x
tactic
MITRE ATT&CK Technique
T1056.001 - Keylogging
technique
9x
timeline
Temporal Reference
September 3, 2024
date
3x
infrastructure
Software Version
6.2
version
2x
malware
Offensive Tool
Mimikatz
tool
2x
target region
Target Country
Taiwan, Province of China
country
2x
general metric
E7 B1
89
e7 b1
2x
general metric
Bbd13Fe9
7,971
bbd13fe9
2x
general metric
5B Bf C5
34
5b bf c5
Contextual Telemetry
Context Block
35 METRICS
industry
Targeted Sector
Government
sector
tactic
Cyber Operation Type
Keylogging
tactic
general metric
Part
2
part
target region
Target Region
AFRICA
region
campaign
Campaign
Operation ShadowCloud
operation
infrastructure
Affected Product
Windows
software
general metric
Type
1
type
data breach
Byte
16
byte
general metric
Mozilla
5
mozilla
general metric
Hardcoded Details
18
hardcoded details
general metric
×
80
×
general metric
Mode
3
mode
victims
Users Mode
4
users mode
data breach
Chars%>\C$\Hiddenfile.Txt
8
chars%>\c$\hiddenfile.txt
general metric
Applewebkit
537
applewebkit
infrastructure
Host
1
host
general metric
Port
443
port
general metric
75F648Ce7Cec,1\
4,047
75f648ce7cec,1\
malware
Malware Payload
PLEAD
tool
general metric
4D
53
4d
general metric
A1 3F
95
a1 3f
general metric
B7
26
b7
general metric
5D B9
87
5d b9
general metric
Dd 8B
75
dd 8b
general metric
Search
9
search
general metric
+
91
+
data breach
Bytes
33,792
bytes
general metric
Token Http
0
token http
general metric
Connection
1
connection
general metric
B3
17
b3
general metric
Dd
52
dd
general metric
A7 9F F3
47
a7 9f f3
general metric
0E Ba
14
0e ba
general metric
Kb
45
kb
general metric
Channels Protocol Version
7
channels protocol version
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