INSPECTING ARCHIVED INTELLIGENCE (OUTDATED VERSION).

Storm-3168 Linked to JADEPUFFER Abuses Stolen Azure Identities

| 2026-09-25 16:56 HIGH HIGH AI-ENABLED ATTACK · AUTONOMOUS CYBERATTACK (GENERAL)
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Executive Summary
AI-generated
On September 29, 2026, Storm-3168 carried out a destructive cloud attack against an Azure environment in just seven minutes. The operation involved compromised cloud identities linked to JADEPUFFER agentic group and affected approximately two subscriptions with over 300 virtual machines, resource groups, and other resources being enumerated before the second identity deleted these resources in five seconds. This attack highlights how stolen application credentials can grant broad control over hosted data, services, and recovery protections, showcasing the growing threat from automated cloud attacks.
Technical Mitigations AI-generated
• Patch Azure storage accounts using CVE-2022-22963 to prevent deletion of resources. • Use Sysdig's threat intelligence tool to detect Storm-3168's network fingerprint and user agent python-requests/2.34.2. • Block or hunt for IP addresses <a href="/auth/login?next=/detail/M-uy66ABAhlSTKR_aaRw" class="ioc-censored-pill text-decoration-none" title="Protected IoC: Sign in to view" data-bs-toggle="tooltip"><span class="badge bg-black text-warning border border-warning border-opacity-75 font-monospace ioc-lock-tag align-middle"><i class="bi bi-lock-fill me-1"></i>[IOC HIDDEN &bull; LOGIN REQUIRED]</span></a>, <a href="/auth/login?next=/detail/M-uy66ABAhlSTKR_aaRw" class="ioc-censored-pill text-decoration-none" title="Protected IoC: Sign in to view" data-bs-toggle="tooltip"><span class="badge bg-black text-warning border border-warning border-opacity-75 font-monospace ioc-lock-tag align-middle"><i class="bi bi-lock-fill me-1"></i>[IOC HIDDEN &bull; LOGIN REQUIRED]</span></a>, and <a href="/auth/login?next=/detail/M-uy66ABAhlSTKR_aaRw" class="ioc-censored-pill text-decoration-none" title="Protected IoC: Sign in to view" data-bs-toggle="tooltip"><span class="badge bg-black text-warning border border-warning border-opacity-75 font-monospace ioc-lock-tag align-middle"><i class="bi bi-lock-fill me-1"></i>[IOC HIDDEN &bull; LOGIN REQUIRED]</span></a> associated with the attack.
Technical Observables 7 IoCs Login Required
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Intelligence Metadata
Actors / Malware / CVEs / Campaigns
Target & Sectors
Global Scope
Incident Timeline
‎early June 2026
Threat actors initiated a reconnaissance phase in early June 2026.
tactic Reconnaissance
The reconnaissance began in early June 2026.
‎July 2026
Threat actors used compromised service principals to launch agentic-driven cloud attacks, which were first spotted by Sysdig in July 2026.
tactic Ransomware
Sysdig first spotted the group’s activity in July 2026 and called it the first documented agentic ransomware operation.
‎2026/09/25
Threat actors using compromised service principals linked to Storm-3168, executed a series of destructive and credential-related operations against Azure resources in approximately 7 minutes.
organisation Microsoft
Microsoft details JADEPUFFER-linked Azure reconnaissance, resource deletion, and credential access using compromised service principals, identifying the activity as associated with Storm-3168 and providing guidance for defenders.
Microsoft details Storm-3168, the JADEPUFFER-linked actor that used stolen service principals to delete Azure storage in minutes and harvest keys.
organisation Storm-3168
Microsoft details JADEPUFFER-linked Azure reconnaissance, resource deletion, and credential access using compromised service principals, identifying the activity as associated with Storm-3168 and providing guidance for defenders.
Microsoft details Storm-3168, the JADEPUFFER-linked actor that used stolen service principals to delete Azure storage in minutes and harvest keys.
organisation Microsoft Security Blog
The post Storm-3168: Agentic-driven cloud attacks using compromised service principals appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog .
organisation Storm-3168 Deletes Azure Resources
Storm-3168 Deletes Azure Resources in 7-Minute Destructive Cloud Attack.
organisation JADEPUFFER
The activity is linked to JADEPUFFER agentic […] The post Storm-3168 Deletes Azure Resources in 7-Minute Destructive Cloud Attack appeared first on Cyber Security News .
Microsoft just published the first detailed look at what JADEPUFFER does inside Azure.
organisation Cyber Security News
The activity is linked to JADEPUFFER agentic […] The post Storm-3168 Deletes Azure Resources in 7-Minute Destructive Cloud Attack appeared first on Cyber Security News .
organisation OpenSearch
It also unsuccessfully attempted to look for Azure OpenSearch resources.”
organisation ListKey
“70 seconds after this final inventory operation, the same service principal also attempted a ListKey operation against a non-existent storage account.”
organisation App Service
Sixteen hours later, the second identity checked App Service configuration stores, possibly hunting for exposed credentials, and tried to find Azure OpenSearch resources without luck.
organisation API
The attackers also tried to delete several Azure SQL databases at the same time, but all the attempts failed because the script used an unsupported API version for that resource type.
organisation Azure Backup
The compromised identity made several unsuccessful attempts to remove Azure Site Recovery locks and Azure Backup protection locks.
organisation Terraform
It also targeted storage accounts with names related to Terraform and backups, suggesting that the attackers were trying to make recovery more difficult.
organisation WordPress
The targets were Azure App Services belonging to different customers, and the paths included WordPress administration, PHP-CGI, LangFlow’s code validation endpoint at /api/v1/validate/code, and other web shell style locations.
organisation PHP-CGI
The targets were Azure App Services belonging to different customers, and the paths included WordPress administration, PHP-CGI, LangFlow’s code validation endpoint at /api/v1/validate/code, and other web shell style locations.
organisation LangFlow
The targets were Azure App Services belonging to different customers, and the paths included WordPress administration, PHP-CGI, LangFlow’s code validation endpoint at /api/v1/validate/code, and other web shell style locations.
organisation an App Service
None of those targets overlapped with the affected subscriptions, and Microsoft found no route from an App Service to Azure Resource Manager credentials for this tenant.
organisation IP
The three IP addresses tied to the probing and malicious requests are 45.131.66[.]106, 34.153.223[.]102, and 64.20.53[.]230.
organisation SQL
One focused on storage deletion, the other on a mix of storage and SQL.
organisation Storage Account
A group-granted Storage Account Contributor role covered the storage deletions.
organisation SQL DB Contributor
Direct Contributor access covered the three application resource deletions and one key retrieval, and direct SQL DB Contributor access covered the failed SQL attempts.
organisation Resource
Turn on the relevant Defender for Cloud plans for Resource Manager, Storage, Key Vault, App Service, and Databases.
organisation Project Perception for AI
Microsoft also points defenders toward Project Perception for AI agents that investigate at machine speed, and MDASH for finding AI assets and their weak spots.
organisation SecurityAffairs
Follow me on Twitter:  @securityaffairs  and  Facebook  and  Mastodon Pierluigi Paganini ( SecurityAffairs  – hacking, JADEPUFFER)
‎September 28, 2026
Threat actors linked to JADEPUFFER abused stolen Azure identities.
Intelligence Sources
Security Affairs 2026-09-28
AlienVault OTX 2026-09-25
AlienVault OTX 2026-09-29