INSPECTING ARCHIVED INTELLIGENCE (OUTDATED VERSION).
Kimsuky Uses Quasar RAT to Deploy Funhouse Ransomware via
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2026-10-13 12:56
CRITICAL
HIGH
RANSOMWARE & EXTORTION
MALWARE & BOTNETS
STATE-SPONSORED & ESPIONAGE
Executive Summary
AI-generated
A Kimsuky-attributed campaign used a malicious Hangul document, `resume.hwp`, disguised as a resume to deliver Funhouse ransomware on October 17, 2026. The attack affected at least one entity, with indicators of compromise including IP addresses and hashes associated with the malware. The attackers deployed multi-stage scripts using Quasar RAT, which extracted `[IOC HIDDEN • LOGIN REQUIRED]` and a corresponding manifest/script file into the Windows temporary directory when opened, displaying a hyperlink masquerading as a PDF that launched `[IOC HIDDEN • LOGIN REQUIRED]`, identified as a VBScript editor. As of October 17, 2026, the current status is unclear, with no further information available on whether the attack has been mitigated or if additional entities have been affected.
Technical Mitigations AI-generated
• Block or hunt for the Hangul process (`hangul.exe`) associated with malicious OLE data delivery.
• Use a sandbox environment to detect and analyze scripts executed by `vbsedit`.
• Monitor `%TEMP%` directory for suspicious files dropped by malicious OLE data.
Technical Observables 28 IoCs Login Required
Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) Protected
Raw threat telemetry, malicious IP addresses, file hashes, and direct VirusTotal correlation are restricted to authenticated users.
domains 6
ips 3
md5 5
urls 11
emails 2
files 1
Intelligence Metadata
Actors / Malware / CVEs / Campaigns
KimsukyKimsuky
Target & Sectors
Global Scope
Incident Timeline
early 2026
Kimsuky hackers used malicious resume documents to deploy Funhouse ransomware, mirroring earlier endpoint operations from early 2026.
Click on any entity below to view its context and source!
tactic
Ransomware
The campaign shares significant similarities with earlier Kimsuky Endpoint ransomware operations from early 2026, including identical mutex values, similar batch file structures, and comparable Quasar RAT configurations.
threat_actor
Kimsuky
The campaign shares significant similarities with earlier Kimsuky Endpoint ransomware operations from early 2026, including identical mutex values, similar batch file structures, and comparable Quasar RAT configurations.
2026/10/13
Kimsuky hackers used malicious Korean-language documents disguised as resumes to deploy Funhouse ransomware through a chain of scripts and remote access tools.
Click on any entity below to view its context and source!
threat_actor
Kimsuky
Kimsuky Hackers Use Malicious Resume Documents to Deploy Funhouse Ransomware.
Kimsuky hackers have used a malicious résumé document to deploy Funhouse ransomware through a chain of scripts and remote access tools.
The campaign connects document-based deception […] The post Kimsuky Hackers Use Malicious Resume Documents to Deploy Funhouse Ransomware appeared first on Cyber Security News .
organisation
Endpoint
From Endpoint to Funhouse: Evolution of the Ransomware Family and Kimsuky-Related Distribution Cases..
ASEC identified a Kimsuky-linked ransomware distribution case in which a malicious HWP resume document delivered Funhouse ransomware, a variant of the previously documented Endpoint ransomware.
From Endpoint to Funhouse: Evolution of Ransomware Families and Kimsuky-Linked Distribution Cases.
From Endpoint to Funhouse: Changes in Ransomware Families and Kimsuky-Related Distribution Cases.
organisation
Funhouse
From Endpoint to Funhouse: Evolution of the Ransomware Family and Kimsuky-Related Distribution Cases..
ASEC identified a Kimsuky-linked ransomware distribution case in which a malicious HWP resume document delivered Funhouse ransomware, a variant of the previously documented Endpoint ransomware.
Overview AhnLab SEcurity intelligence Center (ASEC) recently identified a case in which the Kimsuky group ultimately distributed the Funhouse ransomware via a malicious Hangul document that was disguised as a resume.
A North Korean threat actor distributed Funhouse ransomware through malicious Korean-language documents disguised as resumes.
organisation
Deploy Funhouse Ransomware
Kimsuky Hackers Use Malicious Resume Documents to Deploy Funhouse Ransomware.
Kimsuky Uses Quasar RAT to Deploy Funhouse Ransomware Through Multi-Stage Scripts..
organisation
ASEC
From Endpoint to Funhouse: Evolution of the Ransomware Family and Kimsuky-Related Distribution Cases..
ASEC identified a Kimsuky-linked ransomware distribution case in which a malicious HWP resume document delivered Funhouse ransomware, a variant of the previously documented Endpoint ransomware.
Overview AhnLab SEcurity intelligence Center (ASEC) recently identified a case in which the Kimsuky group ultimately distributed the Funhouse ransomware via a malicious Hangul document that was disguised as a resume.
organisation
HWP
From Endpoint to Funhouse: Evolution of the Ransomware Family and Kimsuky-Related Distribution Cases..
ASEC identified a Kimsuky-linked ransomware distribution case in which a malicious HWP resume document delivered Funhouse ransomware, a variant of the previously documented Endpoint ransomware.
A notable shift involves using HWP documents instead of LNK files as initial infection vectors.
organisation
OLE
The document contains malicious OLE data that extracts `pdf.exe` and a corresponding manifest/script file into the Windows temporary directory when opened.
The HWP file contained embedded malicious OLE data.
organisation
Cyber Security News
The campaign connects document-based deception […] The post Kimsuky Hackers Use Malicious Resume Documents to Deploy Funhouse Ransomware appeared first on Cyber Security News .
organisation
Ransomware Families
From Endpoint to Funhouse: Changes in Ransomware Families and Kimsuky-Related Distribution Cases.
infrastructure
Windows
The document contains malicious OLE data that extracts `pdf.exe` and a corresponding manifest/script file into the Windows temporary directory when opened.
organisation
VBScript
Clicking the link launches `pdf.exe`, identified as a VBScript editor, which processes the malicious manifest.
organisation
PDF
It also displays a hyperlink masquerading as a PDF, such as `resume_{name}.pdf`.
organisation
LNK
A notable shift involves using HWP documents instead of LNK files as initial infection vectors.
Tactical Metrics
Metrics
infrastructure
Windows
Affected Product
Click for context!
The document contains malicious OLE data that extracts `pdf.exe` and a corresponding manifest/script file into the Windows temporary directory when opened.
Intelligence Sources
AlienVault OTX
2026-10-12
AlienVault OTX
2026-10-14
AlienVault OTX
2026-10-17
AlienVault OTX
2026-10-13
AlienVault OTX
2026-10-12
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Tactical Intelligence
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Incident Version History
CURRENT VERSION
Last Updated: 2026-11-12T08:29
Comprehensive Tactical Telemetry
Highly Correlated Entities
11x
organisation
Identified Entity
Deploy Funhouse Ransomware
entity
Contextual Telemetry
Context Block
6 METRICS
tactic
Cyber Operation Type
Ransomware
tactic
threat actor
APT Group
Kimsuky
actor
infrastructure
Affected Product
Windows
software
source region
Origin Region
DPRK
region
tactic
MITRE ATT&CK Technique
T1059.001 - PowerShell
technique
timeline
Temporal Reference
early 2026
date
Click on any entity below to view its context in the main text!
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