INSPECTING ARCHIVED INTELLIGENCE (OUTDATED VERSION).
LiteLLM Suspects GitHub Token Leak in AI Gateway Logs
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2026-10-22 08:28
CRITICAL
HIGH
DATA BREACH
SUPPLY CHAIN
Executive Summary
AI-generated
On October 21, 2026, around 4:00 a.m. PST, threat actors compromised LiteLLM's release pipeline to push a malicious version of the Python package containing a credential stealer and a backdoor. The incident affected users who downloaded an unpinned version of LiteLLM between 11:39 a.m. and 1:23 p.m. UTC via pip or used the Docker image v1.107.0, latest, main-latest, or main-stable between 11:46 a.m. and 2:20 p.m. UTC, totaling approximately 3 hours of exposure time. The attackers validated AWS instance role credentials captured from compromised CI runners and Kubernetes nodes from IP addresses 168.100.8[.]57 and 165.227.201[.]8, starting about 4.5 hours post-exfiltration. Wiz observed abuse of stolen credentials, with the attacker using a dual-technique approach to execute arbitrary code from a remote server every hour, turning it into a remote access trojan (RAT).
Technical Mitigations AI-generated
• Patch the Python interpreter to prevent execution of "<a href="/auth/login?next=/detail/kuRCaKEBv3K6n0loHZYK" class="ioc-censored-pill text-decoration-none" title="Protected IoC: Sign in to view" data-bs-toggle="tooltip"><span class="badge bg-black text-warning border border-warning border-opacity-75 font-monospace ioc-lock-tag align-middle"><i class="bi bi-lock-fill me-1"></i>[IOC HIDDEN • LOGIN REQUIRED]</span></a>" and "privcollect"
• Block or hunt for HTTP POST requests to "<a href="/auth/login?next=/detail/kuRCaKEBv3K6n0loHZYK" class="ioc-censored-pill text-decoration-none" title="Protected IoC: Sign in to view" data-bs-toggle="tooltip"><span class="badge bg-black text-warning border border-warning border-opacity-75 font-monospace ioc-lock-tag align-middle"><i class="bi bi-lock-fill me-1"></i>[IOC HIDDEN • LOGIN REQUIRED]</span></a>/healthcheck"
• Use a secure Docker image with immutable release tags
Technical Observables Login Required
Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) Protected
Raw threat telemetry, malicious IP addresses, file hashes, and direct VirusTotal correlation are restricted to authenticated users.
li•••••.dev
co•••••.py
do•••••.txt
si•••••.py
168.100.•••.•••
165.227.•••.•••
Intelligence Metadata
Actors / Malware / CVEs / Campaigns
TeamPCPTeamPCP
Target & Sectors
Global Scope
technologytechnology
Incident Timeline
March 2026
Threat actors used a ".pth" file to launch the stealer program in an incident similar to TeamPCP's March 2026 attack, but no direct connection has been established between this incident and the previous one.
Click on any entity below to view its context and source!
threat_actor
TeamPCP
The use of a ".pth" file to launch the stealer program is notable as it mirrors the modus operandi observed in the
March 2026 attack
attributed to TeamPCP.
organisation
RSA
"The embedded RSA public keys differ, as do the exfiltration implementation and backdoor behavior.
organisation
1.107.0
If 1.107.0 ran anywhere in your environment, rotate every reachable credential and rebuild."
organisation
The Hacker News
However, Socket told The Hacker News that there is no evidence at this stage to link the two incidents.
organisation
Socket
"The public evidence reviewed so far doesn't establish a connection to the March attack," Socket said.
October 19, 2026
An attacker with access to three sets of developer GitHub CLI credentials, including one that granted the ability to run GitHub workflows, temporarily expanded LiteLLM's release permissions for two internal engineers on October 19, 2026.
Click on any entity below to view its context and source!
industry
Technology
General Document Context
organisation
GitHub
The attacker had access to three sets of developer GitHub CLI credentials, including one that had the ability to run GitHub workflows.
October 21, 2026
Threat actors compromised LiteLLM's release pipeline to push a malicious version, 1.107.0, to the Docker Hub registry and PyPI repository via leveraged GitHub CLI credentials.
Click on any entity below to view its context and source!
industry
Technology
General Document Context
infrastructure
1.107.0
On October 21, 2026, LiteLLM's release pipeline was
compromised
to push 1.107.0 to the Docker Hub registry and the Python Package Index (PyPI) repository.
tactic
T1059.006 - Python
On October 21, 2026, LiteLLM's release pipeline was
compromised
to push 1.107.0 to the Docker Hub registry and the Python Package Index (PyPI) repository.
organisation
PyPI
On October 21, 2026, LiteLLM's release pipeline was
compromised
to push 1.107.0 to the Docker Hub registry and the Python Package Index (PyPI) repository.
infrastructure
107.0
The following compromised versions were published -
LiteLLM v1.107.0 (PyPI)
v1.107.0, latest, main-latest, and main-stable (Docker)
v1.107.0, latest, main-latest, and main-stable (GHCR)
Users who downloaded an unpinned version of LiteLLM between 11:39 a.m. and 1:23 p.m. UTC via pip or used the Docker image v1.107.0,
organisation
UTC
The following compromised versions were published -
LiteLLM v1.107.0 (PyPI)
v1.107.0, latest, main-latest, and main-stable (Docker)
v1.107.0, latest, main-latest, and main-stable (GHCR)
Users who downloaded an unpinned version of LiteLLM between 11:39 a.m. and 1:23 p.m. UTC via pip or used the Docker image v1.107.0,
infrastructure
Linux
In addition, the interpreter attempts to execute "sitecustomize.py," which runs only on Linux and macOS machines, and is configured to fetch "domain.txt" from a now-removed GitHub dead drop ("github[.]com/letters9813").
infrastructure
Macos
In addition, the interpreter attempts to execute "sitecustomize.py," which runs only on Linux and macOS machines, and is configured to fetch "domain.txt" from a now-removed GitHub dead drop ("github[.]com/letters9813").
organisation
PST
PST.
organisation
ListModels
ListFoundationModels and a ListModels call, consistent with LLMjacking," Wiz added.
organisation
LLMjacking
ListFoundationModels and a ListModels call, consistent with LLMjacking," Wiz added.
organisation
IAM
"In a small number of environments, the attacker also enumerated IAM (ListRoles, ListUsers, ListAccessKeys) and performed general discovery (ListAccounts, DescribeTrails, etc.).
organisation
ListRoles
"In a small number of environments, the attacker also enumerated IAM (ListRoles, ListUsers, ListAccessKeys) and performed general discovery (ListAccounts, DescribeTrails, etc.).
organisation
ListUsers
"In a small number of environments, the attacker also enumerated IAM (ListRoles, ListUsers, ListAccessKeys) and performed general discovery (ListAccounts, DescribeTrails, etc.).
organisation
ListAccounts
"In a small number of environments, the attacker also enumerated IAM (ListRoles, ListUsers, ListAccessKeys) and performed general discovery (ListAccounts, DescribeTrails, etc.).
organisation
DescribeTrails
"In a small number of environments, the attacker also enumerated IAM (ListRoles, ListUsers, ListAccessKeys) and performed general discovery (ListAccounts, DescribeTrails, etc.).
organisation
CLI
However, after the open-source project maintainers temporarily expanded release permissions to allow two internal engineers to publish daily bugfix backports for customers, the attacker leveraged their access to three sets of developer GitHub CLI credentials to ultimately push a malicious version.
2026/10/22
Threat actors compromised multiple independent security controls to push a malicious version of the Python package containing a credential stealer and a backdoor.
Click on any entity below to view its context and source!
organisation
CI
Wiz said it has since observed abuse of stolen credentials, starting about 4.5 hours post-exfiltration, with the attacker validating AWS instance role credentials captured from compromised CI runners and Kubernetes nodes from the following IP addresses between 4:20 p.m. and 5:01 p.m. UTC -
168.100.8[.]57
165.227.201[.]8
"Each credential was checked with sts:GetCallerIdentity, followed…
organisation
Kubernetes
Wiz said it has since observed abuse of stolen credentials, starting about 4.5 hours post-exfiltration, with the attacker validating AWS instance role credentials captured from compromised CI runners and Kubernetes nodes from the following IP addresses between 4:20 p.m. and 5:01 p.m. UTC -
168.100.8[.]57
165.227.201[.]8
"Each credential was checked with sts:GetCallerIdentity, followed…
organisation
IP
Wiz said it has since observed abuse of stolen credentials, starting about 4.5 hours post-exfiltration, with the attacker validating AWS instance role credentials captured from compromised CI runners and Kubernetes nodes from the following IP addresses between 4:20 p.m. and 5:01 p.m. UTC -
168.100.8[.]57
165.227.201[.]8
"Each credential was checked with sts:GetCallerIdentity, followed…
infrastructure
1.107.0
"
Developers are advised to remove LiteLLM 1.107.0 from their machines, isolate hosts on which the malicious version was installed, hunt for the malicious Python artifacts, block access to the exfiltration domain, rotate all credentials, and investigate the execution of "/codepy."
"A single compromised install can hand an attacker the ability to push malicious code downstream," JFrog securit…
organisation
raw[.]githubusercontent[.]com/letters9813
"Every hour, the daemon fetches the attacker's current C2 domain from a GitHub repository (raw[.]githubusercontent[.]com/letters9813/pythonclient-test/main/domain[.]txt), then fetches and executes a Python payload from
According to Google-owned cloud security subsidiary Wiz, the text file was only populated with initial test values prior to its takedown by GitHub around 1:30 p.m. UTC.
organisation
domain[.]txt
"Every hour, the daemon fetches the attacker's current C2 domain from a GitHub repository (raw[.]githubusercontent[.]com/letters9813/pythonclient-test/main/domain[.]txt), then fetches and executes a Python payload from
According to Google-owned cloud security subsidiary Wiz, the text file was only populated with initial test values prior to its takedown by GitHub around 1:30 p.m. UTC.
organisation
Suspects GitHub
LiteLLM Suspects GitHub Token Leak in AI Gateway Logs Behind Malicious Package Release.
Tactical Metrics
Metrics
infrastructure
1.107.0
Software Version
Click for context!
"
Developers are advised to remove LiteLLM 1.107.0 from their machines, isolate hosts on which the malicious version was installed, hunt for the malicious Python artifacts, block access to the exfiltration domain, rotate all credentials, and investigate the execution of "/codepy."
"A single compromised install can hand an attacker the ability to push malicious code downstream," JFrog securit…
On October 21, 2026, LiteLLM's release pipeline was
compromised
to push 1.107.0 to the Docker Hub registry and the Python Package Index (PyPI) repository.
If 1.107.0 ran anywhere in your environment, rotate every reachable credential and rebuild."
Metrics
infrastructure
107.0
Software Version
The following compromised versions were published -
LiteLLM v1.107.0 (PyPI)
v1.107.0, latest, main-latest, and main-stable (Docker)
v1.107.0, latest, main-latest, and main-stable (GHCR)
Users who downloaded an unpinned version of LiteLLM between 11:39 a.m. and 1:23 p.m. UTC via pip or used the Docker image v1.107.0,
Metrics
infrastructure
Linux
Affected Product
In addition, the interpreter attempts to execute "sitecustomize.py," which runs only on Linux and macOS machines, and is configured to fetch "domain.txt" from a now-removed GitHub dead drop ("github[.]com/letters9813").
Metrics
infrastructure
Macos
Affected Product
In addition, the interpreter attempts to execute "sitecustomize.py," which runs only on Linux and macOS machines, and is configured to fetch "domain.txt" from a now-removed GitHub dead drop ("github[.]com/letters9813").
Intelligence Sources
The Hacker News
2026-10-22
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Incident Version History
CURRENT VERSION
Last Updated: 2026-10-23T10:39
Comprehensive Tactical Telemetry
Highly Correlated Entities
22x
organisation
Identified Entity
CI
entity
3x
timeline
Temporal Reference
October 21, 2026
date
2x
infrastructure
Software Version
1.107.0
version
2x
infrastructure
Affected Product
Linux
software
Contextual Telemetry
Context Block
6 METRICS
industry
Targeted Sector
Technology
sector
tactic
Cyber Operation Type
Exfiltration
tactic
general metric
Hours
4
hours
tactic
MITRE ATT&CK Technique
T1059.006 - Python
technique
attribution
Attributing Entity
Google
authority
threat actor
APT Group
TeamPCP
actor
Click on any entity below to view its context in the main text!
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