INSPECTING ARCHIVED INTELLIGENCE (OUTDATED VERSION).
APT28 Conducts Long-Term Espionage on Ukrainian Forces Using Custom Malware
| 2026-03-10 15:14 CRITICAL MEDIUMExecutive Summary AI-generated
A Russia-linked group, APT28, has been conducting long-term surveillance of Ukrainian military personnel using advanced malware tools. The group operates out of the Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate's 26165 unit and employs tactics such as phishing campaigns and unauthorized access to government email accounts. Recent incidents include a recent phishing campaign linked to Russia that targets Ukrainian organizations with two new malware families, BadPaw and MeowMeow. Researchers have also found evidence of APT28 using custom implants designed to maintain persistent access and collect sensitive information from targeted systems since April 2024. The group's use of advanced tools such as BEARDSHELL and COVENANT has allowed them to evade detection for years, making it a significant threat to Ukraine's national security.
Technical Mitigations AI-generated
* Implement a cloud-first security strategy: Organizations should consider moving their sensitive data to the cloud, where it can be more securely stored and accessed. This includes using cloud-based services like Icedrive for file sharing and encryption tools like AES.
* Use robust antivirus software: Install and regularly update antivirus software that is specifically designed to detect and remove malware from various types of threats, including those used by APT28.
* Regularly back up sensitive data: Ensure that all critical data is backed up regularly, both locally and in the cloud. This will help prevent data loss in case of a cyber attack or system failure.
* Monitor for suspicious activity: Implement monitoring tools to detect any unusual activity on systems, including those related to APT28's BEARDSHELL and COVENANT malware. This can include network traffic analysis and log file review.
* Use secure coding practices: Developers should adhere to best practices for secure coding, such as using strong encryption methods like ChaCha20-Poly1305 in their code, and avoiding common vulnerabilities like buffer overflows.
Technical Observables
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Intelligence Metadata
Actors / Malware / CVEs / Campaigns
APT28APT28
X-TunnelX-TunnelXagentXagentSednitSednitSofacySofacyXTunnelXTunnel
Target & Sectors
NORTH_AMERICA
NORTH_AMERICA
governmentgovernment
defensedefense
Incident Timeline
at least 2007
APT28 used custom malware to conduct long-term espionage on Ukrainian forces.
Click on any entity below to view its context and source!
threat_actor
APT28
The
APT28
group has been active since at least 2007 and it has targeted governments, militaries, and security organizations worldwide.
late 2014
Threat actors used XAgent to conduct long-term espionage on Ukrainian forces using custom malware.
Click on any entity below to view its context and source!
tactic
Keylogging
It's assessed that the 2018 artifacts and the 2024 SLIMAGENT sample originated from XAgent, with ESET's analysis uncovering overlaps in the keylogging between SLIMAGENT and an
XAgent sample
detected in the wild in late 2014.
organisation
XAgent
It's assessed that the 2018 artifacts and the 2024 SLIMAGENT sample originated from XAgent, with ESET's analysis uncovering overlaps in the keylogging between SLIMAGENT and an
XAgent sample
detected in the wild in late 2014.
at least 2018
Threat actors used SLIMAGENT to conduct long-term espionage on Ukrainian forces.
Click on any entity below to view its context and source!
tactic
Espionage
Evidence suggests SLIMAGENT has been deployed as a standalone espionage tool since at least 2018.
April 2021
Sednit developed and used custom malware to conduct long-term espionage on Ukrainian forces.
Click on any entity below to view its context and source!
malware
Sednit
"These adaptations show that Sednit developers acquired deep expertise in Covenant – an implant whose official development ceased in April 2021 and may have been considered unused by defenders," ESET said.
April 2024
APT28 used BEARDSHELL and COVENANT malware to spy on Ukrainian military personnel.
Click on any entity below to view its context and source!
threat_actor
APT28
APT28 conducts long-term espionage on Ukrainian forces using custom malware
APT28 used BEARDSHELL and COVENANT malware to spy on Ukrainian military personnel, enabling long-term surveillance since April 2024.
The Russia-linked group
APT28
(aka UAC-0001, aka
Fancy Bear
,
Pawn Storm
,
Sofacy Group
,
Sednit
, BlueDelta, and
STRONTIUM
) has used
BEARDSHELL
and
COVENANT
malware to conduct long-term surveillance of Ukrainian military personnel.
target_region
Ukraine
APT28 conducts long-term espionage on Ukrainian forces using custom malware
APT28 used BEARDSHELL and COVENANT malware to spy on Ukrainian military personnel, enabling long-term surveillance since April 2024.
tactic
Espionage
APT28 conducts long-term espionage on Ukrainian forces using custom malware
APT28 used BEARDSHELL and COVENANT malware to spy on Ukrainian military personnel, enabling long-term surveillance since April 2024.
organisation
ESET
According to ESET, the campaign began in April 2024 and relies on custom implants designed to maintain persistent access and collect sensitive information from targeted systems.
The two malware families have been put to use since April 2024, ESET
said
in a new report shared with The Hacker News.
malware
Sednit
“Since April 2024, Sednit’s advanced development team has reemerged with a modern toolkit centered on two paired implants, BeardShell and Covenant, each using a different cloud provider for resilience.” reads the
report
published by ESET.
organisation
The Hacker News
The two malware families have been put to use since April 2024, ESET
said
in a new report shared with The Hacker News.
organisation
BlueDelta
The Russia-linked group
APT28
(aka UAC-0001, aka
Fancy Bear
,
Pawn Storm
,
Sofacy Group
,
Sednit
, BlueDelta, and
STRONTIUM
) has used
BEARDSHELL
and
COVENANT
malware to conduct long-term surveillance of Ukrainian military personnel.
infrastructure
Windows
SLIMAGENT captures screenshots using Windows APIs, encrypts them with AES and RSA, and stores them locally with timestamped filenames.
organisation
AES
SLIMAGENT captures screenshots using Windows APIs, encrypts them with AES and RSA, and stores them locally with timestamped filenames.
organisation
RSA
SLIMAGENT captures screenshots using Windows APIs, encrypts them with AES and RSA, and stores them locally with timestamped filenames.
organisation
ChaCha20-Poly1305
BEARDSHELL downloads, decrypts (using ChaCha20-Poly1305), and runs PowerShell scripts, sending results via the Icedrive API.
organisation
APT
Both tools are stealthy, use strong encryption, and exploit legitimate cloud services to avoid detection, highlighting modern APT tactics.
organisation
SlimAgent
“SlimAgent includes several features that were absent from the 2018 samples, such as encryption of the collected logs.
May 2025
APT28 used custom malware, specifically BeardShell and Covenant, to conduct long-term espionage on Ukrainian forces.
Click on any entity below to view its context and source!
target_region
Ukraine
In May 2025, ESET researchers reported unauthorized access to an email account in the Ukrainian government’s gov.ua domain.
industry
Government
In May 2025, ESET researchers reported unauthorized access to an email account in the Ukrainian government’s gov.ua domain.
observable
gov.ua
In May 2025, ESET researchers reported unauthorized access to an email account in the Ukrainian government’s gov.ua domain.
organisation
ClearSky
Recently, ClearSky researchers
reported
a phishing campaign linked to Russia that targets Ukrainian organizations using two new malware families, BadPaw and MeowMeow.
organisation
BadPaw
Recently, ClearSky researchers
reported
a phishing campaign linked to Russia that targets Ukrainian organizations using two new malware families, BadPaw and MeowMeow.
threat_actor
APT28
Analysis shows that SLIMAGENT likely evolved from the XAgent keylogger long used by APT28.
ESET noted that BEARDSHELL uses a rare obfuscation method called
opaque predicate
, previously seen in
XTunnel
, a tool used by APT28 during the Democratic National Committee hack.
The cybersecurity firm reports that developers behind APT28 have developed strong expertise in the Covenant framework, despite its official development ending in 2021.
organisation
Analysis
Analysis shows that SLIMAGENT likely evolved from the XAgent keylogger long used by APT28.
organisation
XAgent
Analysis shows that SLIMAGENT likely evolved from the XAgent keylogger long used by APT28.
organisation
the Democratic National Committee
ESET noted that BEARDSHELL uses a rare obfuscation method called
opaque predicate
, previously seen in
XTunnel
, a tool used by APT28 during the Democratic National Committee hack.
organisation
tandem
“we have shown that Sednit’s advanced development team is active once again, operating an arsenal centered on two implants – BeardShell and Covenant – deployed in tandem and each leveraging a different cloud provider.” concludes the report.
organisation
HTA
When opened, an HTA file displays a Ukrainian-language lure about border crossing appeals while secretly launching the infection chain.
organisation
SecurityAffairs
Follow me on Twitter:
@securityaffairs
and
Facebook
and
Mastodon
Pierluigi Paganini
(
SecurityAffairs
– hacking, Russia)
organisation
Filen
Another tool, COVENANT, has been heavily modified to support long-term espionage and uses cloud services like Filen for command-and-control communications.
organisation
HTML
Researchers found strong code similarities, including identical keylogging logic and HTML-based logging with the same color scheme for captured data.
June 2025
Threat actors used custom malware to conduct long-term espionage on Ukrainian forces.
Click on any entity below to view its context and source!
target_region
Ukraine
SLIMAGENT was first
publicly documented
by the Computer Emergency Response Team of Ukraine (CERT-UA) in June 2025.
attribution
CERT-UA
SLIMAGENT was first
publicly documented
by the Computer Emergency Response Team of Ukraine (CERT-UA) in June 2025.
attribution
the Computer Emergency Response Team of Ukraine
SLIMAGENT was first
publicly documented
by the Computer Emergency Response Team of Ukraine (CERT-UA) in June 2025.
July 2025
Threat actors used COVENANT, an open-source .NET post-exploitation framework, to conduct long-term espionage on Ukrainian forces.
Click on any entity below to view its context and source!
tactic
Espionage
A third major piece of the threat actor's toolkit is COVENANT, an open-source .NET post-exploitation framework that has been "heavily" modified to support long-term espionage and to implement a new cloud-based network protocol that abuses the Filen cloud storage service for C2 since July 2025.
organisation
Filen
A third major piece of the threat actor's toolkit is COVENANT, an open-source .NET post-exploitation framework that has been "heavily" modified to support long-term espionage and to implement a new cloud-based network protocol that abuses the Filen cloud storage service for C2 since July 2025.
the 2010s
Threat actors used APT28 custom malware to conduct long-term espionage on Ukrainian forces.
Click on any entity below to view its context and source!
threat_actor
APT28
SLIMAGENT, per the Slovakian cybersecurity company, has its roots in
XAgent
, another implant used by APT28 in the 2010s to facilitate
remote control and data exfiltration
.
tactic
Exfiltration
SLIMAGENT, per the Slovakian cybersecurity company, has its roots in
XAgent
, another implant used by APT28 in the 2010s to facilitate
remote control and data exfiltration
.
Mar 10, 2026
Threat actors used custom malware to conduct long-term espionage on Ukrainian forces.
2024-2025
Threat actors used Koofr to target Ukrainian forces using custom malware.
Click on any entity below to view its context and source!
threat_actor
APT28
Previously, APT28's COVENANT variant was said to have used pCloud (in 2023) and Koofr (in 2024-2025).
organisation
Koofr
Previously, APT28's COVENANT variant was said to have used pCloud (in 2023) and Koofr (in 2024-2025).
2026-03-10
APT28, also known as Blue Athena, BlueDelta, Fancy Bear, Fighting Ursa, Forest Blizzard (formerly Strontium), FROZENLAKE, Iron Twilight, ITG05, Pawn Storm, Sednit, Sofacy, and TA422, is a nation-state actor affiliated with Unit 26165 of the Russian Federation's military intelligence agency GRU.
Click on any entity below to view its context and source!
threat_actor
APT28
Ravie Lakshmanan
Mar 10, 2026
Cyber Espionage / Threat Intelligence
The Russian state-sponsored hacking group tracked as
APT28
has been observed using a pair of implants dubbed BEARDSHELL and COVENANT to facilitate long‑term surveillance of Ukrainian military personnel.
APT28 conducts long-term espionage on Ukrainian forces using custom malware.
APT28, also tracked as Blue Athena, BlueDelta, Fancy Bear, Fighting Ursa, Forest Blizzard (formerly Strontium), FROZENLAKE, Iron Twilight, ITG05, Pawn Storm, Sednit, Sofacy, and TA422, is a nation-state actor affiliated with Unit 26165 of the Russian Federation's military intelligence agency GRU.
In 2021, Trellix
revealed
that APT28 deployed Graphite, a backdoor that employed OneDrive for C2, and PowerShell Empire in attacks targeting high-ranking government officials overseeing national security policy and individuals in the defense sector in Western Asia.
APT28 Uses BEARDSHELL and COVENANT Malware to Spy on Ukrainian Military.
A noteworthy aspect of the malware is that it utilizes a distinctive obfuscation technique referred to as
opaque predicate
, which is also found in
XTunnel
(aka X-Tunnel), a
network traversal and pivoting tool
used by APT28 in the 2016 Democratic National Committee (DNC) hack.
organisation
Spy on Ukrainian Military
APT28 Uses BEARDSHELL and COVENANT Malware to Spy on Ukrainian Military.
organisation
DNC
A noteworthy aspect of the malware is that it utilizes a distinctive obfuscation technique referred to as
opaque predicate
, which is also found in
XTunnel
(aka X-Tunnel), a
network traversal and pivoting tool
used by APT28 in the 2016 Democratic National Committee (DNC) hack.
organisation
HTML
"SLIMAGENT emits its espionage logs in the HTML format, with the application name, the logged keystrokes, and the window name in blue, red, and green, respectively," ESET said.
Tactical Metrics
Metrics
infrastructure
Windows
Affected Product
Click for context!
SLIMAGENT captures screenshots using Windows APIs, encrypts them with AES and RSA, and stores them locally with timestamped filenames.
Intelligence Sources
Security Affairs
2026-03-10
The Hacker News
2026-03-10
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Incident Version History
CURRENT VERSION
Last Updated: 2026-04-27T10:35
Comprehensive Tactical Telemetry
Highly Correlated Entities
21x
organisation
Identified Entity
BlueDelta
entity
17x
timeline
Temporal Reference
May 2025
date
10x
attribution
Attributing Entity
85th Main Special Service Center
authority
5x
malware
Malware Payload
Sofacy
tool
4x
tactic
Cyber Operation Type
Phishing
tactic
3x
target region
Target Country
Ukraine
country
2x
source region
Origin Country
Russian Federation
country
2x
industry
Targeted Sector
Government
sector
2x
tactic
MITRE ATT&CK Technique
T1059.001 - PowerShell
technique
Contextual Telemetry
Context Block
4 METRICS
threat actor
APT Group
APT28
actor
infrastructure
Affected Product
Windows
software
general metric
Presidential Election
2,016
presidential election
general metric
Mar
10
mar
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